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Is the Contractor More Secure with a Priority Right? 
A Functional Analysis of Article 286 of PRC Contract Law ∗ 
 
Wei ZHANG 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Background and the Establishment of PRC Contract Law Article 286 
In recent years, China’s economic boom has drawn considerable attention all around the 
world.  Real estate development is among the strongest pillars that support the fast growing GDP 
of this country.  When fascinated by the shining residential buildings, office towers and public 
facilities sprouting across the country, however, we are also surprised at the mountains of the 
outstanding debts that Chinese contractors are not able to collect.  Statistics shows that the 
aggregate amount of overdue payment to contractors has increased steadily during the past 15 
years nationwide, with about $440 million in 1990, $2.4 billion in 1992, $3.7 billion in 1993 and 
$7.3 billion in 1995.1  As of 2004, that number climbed to a record $45 billion.2 
                                                    
∗  I owe my thanks to Kuang Duan (Fudan University Law School), Xiumin Qin (Tianjin Dagang District 
People’s Court), Jian Zhang (Fujian Jun Li Law Firm, Beijing Office), Yunwei Chen (Shanghai Zhu Le 
Construction Development Company), Junhua Miao (Bank of Communications, Shanghai Branch), Hao 
Kuang (Beijing Gong He Law Firm, Shanghai Office) and Yawei Liu (Hao Ying Law Firm), for their 
assistance in collecting materials of this paper.  I am also indebted to Howard Y. Yang (Debevoise & 
Plimpton LLP, New York Office), for proofreading as well as his insightful comments. 
1  Yibing Wang, Lun Jian Zhu Gong Cheng Cheng Bao Ren De Fa Ding Di Ya Quan [On the Construction 
Contractor’s Statutory Mortgage], 11 Dang Dai Fa Xue [Modern Legal Science] 139, 139 (2002). 
2  Xinhua News Agency, Quan Guo Tuo Qian Gong Cheng Kuan 3660 Yi; Ming Nian Nian Di Qian Wan 
Cheng Qing Qian [The Defaulted Construction Price Totals to 366 Billion RMB Yuan Throughout the 
Country; Collection to Be Finished by the End of Next Year] (Aug 24th, 2004), at 
http://news.cq.soufun.com/2004-08-27/315846.htm.  
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Burdened with this huge sum of overdue payments, contractors are forced to delay the 
payment of wages to their employees, especially those who are physically involved in the 
construction work.  The bulk of labor force in Chinese construction market comes from the 
nation’s vast countryside that is still lagging behind in economic development.  To most laborers 
from these areas, wages earned from construction work is the main, if not the sole, financial 
source to support their life and family.  Thus, owners’ default in payment to contractors, leading 
to the nonpayment of wages to construction workers, raises serious social problems regarding 
protection of the vulnerable laborers, and even deepens the imbalance of development between 
urban and suburban areas. 
Against such a social background, legislators added an article into the new PRC Contract 
Law promulgated in 1999 (hereafter, the “Article 286”), which states: 
If the owner fails to pay the contract price as agreed, the contractor may demand that the 
owner pay within a reasonable period of time.  If the owner fails to pay by the 
expiration of the time period, the contractor may reach an agreement with the owner to 
convert the project into its monetary value or he may apply to a people's court to have the 
project auctioned off according to law, unless, in light of the nature of the construction 
project, it is not suited to being converted into its monetary value or auctioned off.  The 
price for the construction project shall be, on a priority basis, offset against the monetary 
value into which the project is converted, or paid from the proceeds of the auction.3 
                                                    
3  The Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 286.  The translation is based on Vol. 13 No. 4 
China Law and Practice 19, 59 (1999), with minor variations. The counter-party of contractor in a 
construction contract is sometimes referred to as “employer” in English legal literature (and is so translated in 
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Obviously, the law wants to provide the contractor with a statutory lien with which the contract 
price can be secured.  In case of the owner’s default, the contractor may credit the sale proceeds 
of the construction project against the amount owed to him. 
 
B. Disputes about the Nature of Article 286 
Soon after this article came into effect, a heated dispute arose regarding the nature of the 
right so created.  In brief, there are three major theories among commentators: possessory lien,4 
priority right5 and statutory mortgage.6 
Under the possessory lien theory, the lien-holder is entitled to sell the collateral to recover 
his credit when the debtor fails to pay the contract price upon the lien-holder’s demand.  
Possessory lien exists only when the lien-holder takes possession of the collateral and according to 
PRC Secured Transaction Law, the eligible collateral for possessory lien is limited to personal 
properties.7 
The concepts of priority right and statutory mortgage do not exist in current PRC Secured 
Transaction Law.  In fact, these two rights are very similar to each other.  Both of them are 
                                                                                                                                                          
China Law and Practice).  To avoid the possible confusion with the employment relationship between the 
contractor, as an employer, and his employees, I use the word “owner” instead.  But it should be noted that 
not all those who contract with contractor for construction work are literally owners of the construction 
projects. 
4  See, e.g., Ping Jiang, Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo He Tong Fa Jing Jie [A Brief Explanation to the 
Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China] 223 (1999); see also Xiangjun Kong, He Tong Fa Jiao 
Cheng [A Textbook on Contract Law] 618 (1999). 
5  See, e.g., Jianyuan Cui and Shiyuan Han, Xin He Tong Fa Yuan Li Yu An Li Ping Xi [The Principle of the 
New Contract Law and Case Analysis] 1220 (1999). 
6  See, e.g., Huixing Liang, He Tong Fa Di 286 Tiao De Quan Li Xing Zhi Yu Shi Yong [The Nature and 
Application of the Right Stipulated by Contract Law Article 286], 19 Min Shang Fa Lun Cong [Civil and 
Commercial Law Review] 375, 375 (2001). 
7  The Secured Transaction Law of the People’s Republic of China, art 82. 
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generally considered as senior rights as compared to consensual mortgages in allocation of 
proceeds of foreclosure sale.  Also, it is not necessary to hold possession of the collateral in order 
to enforce either right.  To a large extent, these two rights are no more than different names of 
essentially the same thing.  In Germany and Taiwan, where the priority right system is generally 
abolished in the civil code, the term of “statutory mortgage” is used, while in Japan, where the 
priority right system survived, this new term seems unnecessary. 8   Moreover, in many 
construction situations, as the contractor usually takes possession of the project during the 
construction process and will possibly keep possession even after that (if the owner fails to pay the 
price), even the concept of possessory lien is not materially different from the other two.  It 
seems that these disputes are of little practical significance.  Therefore, in this paper I will call 
such right as the contractor’s priority right. 
Aside from the above theoretic disputes, another problem, maybe of more practical 
importance, bewildered the judges and lawyers: Does the contractor’s priority right prevail over 
the previously perfected mortgages?  Courts split on this issue.  Some held the priority right 
superior to the mortgage,9 some concluded in the opposite way while still others tried to leave 
Article 286 “dormant”.10  As shown in the proceeding paragraph, those commentators who take 
the views of priority right and statutory mortgage agree that mortgages, even perfected earlier, 
                                                    
8  Germany, Taiwan and Japan are the other 3 jurisdictions with similar institutions that presumably influenced 
the draft of Article 286. 
9  See, e.g. Fujian No.1 Construction Project Corp. v. Sanya Haisheng Construction Corp. Ltd. (Sanya 
Intermediate People’s Court, June 29th, 2000), at 
http://law.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/SLC/SLC.asp?Db=fnl&Gid=117448430. 
10  See generally Shuying Zhu, Zhi De Zhong Shi De Zhi Fa Pian Cha [A Note-Worthy Deviation in Law 
Enforcement] 10 Zhong Guo Lü Shi [Chinese Lawyer] 46 (2001). 
 5 
 
should be subordinate to the right created under Article 286.11  Yet these academic opinions are 
of no binding effects, though some of the commentators are those who actually drafted the 
article.12  The law itself does not mention anything about the priority rank between this right and 
previously established mortgages.  It does say that “the price of construction project shall be paid 
on a priority basis”, but that might as well mean the contractor should be paid just prior to 
unsecured creditors or later perfected mortgagees. 
 
C. Interpretation of the PRC Supreme People’s Court 
To address the priority problem, as well as some other practical issues, the PRC Supreme 
People’s Court interpreted Article 286 in its reply to a request for instruction from Shanghai High 
People’s Court.  This reply was promulgated through the Supreme People’s Court’s official 
bulletin in June 2002 and thus became a formal judicial interpretation (hereafter, the “Supreme 
Court Interpretation”).13  It provides the following: 
(1) When adjudicating real estate disputes and dealing with execution affairs thereof, the 
people’s court should regard the contractor’s priority right as superior to mortgage rights 
and other credits, in accordance to Article 286 of PRC Contract Law. 
(2) If the consumer has paid the whole or the majority of the purchase price for the 
residential real properties, the contractor cannot claim his priority right on such properties 
against the consumer thereafter. 
                                                    
11  Cui and Han, supra note 5, at 1220; Liang, supra note 6, at 378. 
12  Professor Huixing Liang is one of the leading drafters of the PRC Contract law. 
13  In current Chinese judicial system, the official interpretation of the PRC Supreme People’s Court bears 
practically the same legal effect as the law enacted by the legislature. 
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(3) The construction price includes remunerations of employees, material costs and such 
other expenses that the contractor actually paid for the construction work.  But the 
contractor’s damages resulting from owner’s breach should not be included. 
(4) The statute of limitations of the priority right is 6 months, running from the date of the 
completion of the construction work or the completion date as stipulated in the 
construction contract. … 
Supplemented by this interpretation, the law has become somehow clearer.  In brief, Article 286 
is supposed to work as follows: 
 
Note that there exist several exceptions.  First, certain construction projects cannot be sold or 
otherwise converted into monetary value.  Second, the contractor may still be subordinate to 
consumers purchasing the residential units. 
 
D.  Purpose and Structure of This Paper 
 The purpose of this paper is both positive and normative.  The positive study 
Owner fails to pay the price 
Contractor demands payment without 
success 
Contractor enforces the priority right 
Contractor obtains a status superior to 
mortgagees and other creditors 
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investigates the actual operation and predicts the potential functions of the contractor’s priority 
right, while the normative one aims at policy suggestions that calls for certain amendments to the 
current law.  To achieve these goals, I will focus on three entities involved in the operation of 
Article 286 – the court, the bank and the contractor.14 
 In section II, I will explore the application of the contractor’s priority right under current 
legal and social circumstances.  This study shows that Article 286 may not do so much good to 
contractors as legislators expected.  Section III first examines traditional arguments for the 
contractor’s priority right and then provides my own justification on the cost-benefit basis.  
Finally, this section proposes several improvements to better exploit the potential benefits of the 
contractor’s priority right. 
 Due to limitations of the resources at hand, my analysis depends heavily on secondary 
materials.  The conclusions reached in this paper are to be tested by further empirical studies. 
 
II. A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
A. Courts’ Understanding of the Law 
How does the court understand Article 286?  The answer to this question is the starting 
point for a functional analysis of this article.  Courts’ understanding, if known to the relevant 
parties, will directly affect their decision-making in practice.  Many conducts of the parties can 
be regarded as responses to courts’, rather than legislators’, positions.  These positions may shed 
                                                    
14  This approach is largely influenced by Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 
479 (1997). 
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much light on the parties’ incentives behind their choices. 
However, the reported, or even adjudicated, cases on this topic are very limited in number.  
Due to this limitation, it is impossible to explore the judicial understanding in every detail.  
Therefore, in this section, I will trace the judicial understanding merely in two broad aspects, 
which appear to be prevalent among the courts and perhaps also influential upon the parties’ 
incentives. 
1. Objective of the Article 
It seems that, in the courts’ point of view, the main objective of Article 286 is to protect 
the construction laborers by securing the payment of their wages.  One court directly related this 
article to the protection of basic human rights and regarded it as “based on the considerateness to 
the right of existence, recognizing its superior status to other rights, which is in accordance with 
the fundamental requirement of human rights protection”.15  Another court stated in its opinion 
that the “more important reason for the contractor’s priority right, other than securing the 
contractor’s credit of construction price, relies on the fact that the construction project entails the 
labor value of construction workers …” (emphasis added).16 
As the Supreme Court Interpretation shows, the construction price secured by the priority 
right includes two parts.  One is the employees’ remuneration (essentially, laborers’ wages) and 
the other is the actual expenses of the construction work advanced by the contractor for the owner.  
                                                    
15  Chongqing No.1 Intermediate People’s Court, Jian Zhu Gong Cheng You Xian Shou Chang Quan Fa Lü Shi 
Yong Yi Jian Tao Lun Hui Hui Yi Ji Yao [Memorandum on the Conference of Legal Application of the 
Contractor’s Priority Right] 1 (Feb. 2004) (unpublished manuscript). 
16  Nantong Construction Project General Contracting Corp. Hainan Company v. Hainan Guo Ji Mao Yi 
Mansion Corp. Ltd. (Haikou Intermediate People’s Court, Dec. 18th, 2001), at 
http://law.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/SLC/SLC.asp?Db=fnl&Gid=117448278. 
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However, these two parts do not represent the whole construction “price” as Article 286 itself 
provided.  In construction practice, such price is calculated differently.  Usually, it consists of 
four parts: direct fees, indirect fees, profit and tax.  The first two stand for the cost of construction 
work.17  The scope set by the Supreme Court Interpretation roughly covers the direct fees and 
indirect fees, but the profit and tax are puzzlingly left unprotected.  Taking account of courts’ 
above understanding of the objective of the article, the puzzle might be explained in this way: 
Since the contractor’s priority right is deemed to focus on laborer-protection rather than 
contractor-protection, the contractor’s other stakes in the construction contract become less 
important once the employees’ remuneration is fully protected.  As to the actual expenses, they 
might become the most apparent competing interests to the employees’ wages for the construction 
price to be paid by the owner, thus can’t be easily neglected without sacrificing the potential to 
protect the construction laborers. 
Given the background against which Article 286 of PRC Contract was established, the 
court’s view is quite understandable.  However, it is unclear whether that is consistent with the 
legislators’ objective when drafting the law.  Although we can reasonably surmise that the same 
consideration might exist in legislators’ minds because they are facing the same social background 
as judges, no direct evidence was discovered to support such a legislative objective in some 
semi-official legislative interpretations18 published soon after the establishment of the Contract 
                                                    
17  Jian She Gong Cheng Shi Gong Fa Bao Yu Cheng Bao Ji Jia Guan Li Ban Fa [Administrative Measures on 
Price Calculation of Ordering and Contracting of Construction Projects], art. 5; see also Jiandong Wang, Ping 
He Tong Fa Di 286 Tiao [Some Comments on Article 286 of PRC Contract Law], 2 Zhong Guo Fa Xue 
[Chinese Legal Science] 63, 65 (2003). 
18  The official legislative interpretation of law, according to the PRC Constitution, must be enacted as an act by 
the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress, which happens in relatively few occasions.  In 
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Law.  In the two available versions of interpretations to PRC Contract Law edited by the 
Commission of Legislative Affairs of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, 
Article 286 is said to be “for the purpose of protecting the realization of contractor’s price credit 
…” (emphasis added).19  For a functional analysis, the inquiry is less important whether the 
judicial understanding is compatible with the legislative objective.  Yet the actual effect of Article 
286 may possibly fluctuate with the weight shifted from contractor-protection to laborer-protection.  
This point will be further elaborated below in this paper. 
2. Implementation of the Contractor’s Priority Right 
When and how will the court implement the priority right provided by Article 286?  
Two tentative conclusions might be drawn from the relevant materials. 
First, it seems that the plaintiff must claim the contractor’s priority right in her suit; 
otherwise the court may not voluntarily apply this rule.  In other words, if the plaintiff merely 
sues for the construction prices in default but does not allege that these prices should be secured by 
the contractor’s priority right on a specific construction project, the court will only award such 
prices without enforcing the priority right.  I have collected 5 case reports citing PRC Contract 
Law Article 286, and the contractor’s priority right was actually applied in 3 of them.  The 
                                                                                                                                                          
practice, the interpretation made by the Commission of Legislative Affairs can be deemed as a semi-official 
legislative interpretation since this commission is the working department of the Standing Committee in 
charge of the drafting of laws. 
19  The Commission of Legislative Affairs of the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress, Research 
Office (hereafter, Research Office), Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo He Tong Fa Shi Yi [Explanation to 
PRC Contract Law] 421 (1999); see also Kangsheng Hu, Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo He Tong Fa Shi 
Yi [Explanation to PRC Contract Law] 439 (1999).  Kangsheng Hu, current director, served as the vice 
director of the Commission of Legislative Affairs when the PRC Contract was passed. 
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plaintiff positively claimed her priority right in all these 3 cases.20  Nonetheless, in another case, 
as introduced in an article written by a judge, the plaintiff merely claimed the outstanding 
construction price and the court awarded accordingly, without mentioning the application of the 
contractor’s priority right.21 
Second, although Article 286 affirmatively manifested that the contractor, to enforce the 
priority right, “may apply to a people's court to have the project auctioned off”, yet in practice 
courts do not allow the contractor to apply directly for auction without first bringing a suit about 
the owner’s default on paying the price.  In other words, the contractor must get a judgment 
against the owner for the construction prices owed before commencing an execution proceeding to 
enforce his priority right.  A district court judge said during my interview with her, “I have asked 
judges in several other places.  It seems to me that a direct application for executing (the priority 
right provided by) Article 286 (merely with a construction contract) is not permitted in various 
places”.22  This point is further proved by other references.23 
The inconsistency between the procedural law and the substantive law is said to be the 
                                                    
20  See cases in supra note 9, note 16 and Wuhan Geological Probing Foundation Project Corp., Hainan Branch v. 
Sanya Oriental Business Stock Corp. (Sanya Intermediate People’s Court, Aug. 23rd, 2000), at 
http://law.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/SLC/SLC.asp?Db=fnl&Gid=117448425. 
21  See Youhuan Zeng, Ben An Jian She Gong Cheng Kuan You Xian Quan Ying Ru He Ti Xian? [How Should 
the Contractor’s Priority Right Be Reflected in This Case?] 9 Fa Ting [The Court] (2003), at 
http://www.fszjfy.gov.cn/shownews.asp?newsid=2043.  The author is the Vice President of Foshan 
Intermediate People’s Court. 
22  Telephone interview with Xiumin Qin, Judge, Tianjin Dagang District People’s Court (Nov. 4, 2004). 
23  See, e.g. Rong Ma, Lun Jian She Gong Cheng Jia Kuan You Xian Shou Chang Quan De Quan Li Shu Xing Ji 
Qi Zai Si Fa Shi Jian Zhong De Shi Yong [On the Nature of the Contractor’s Priority Right and Its 
Application in Judicial Practice], at http://www.jscourt.gov.cn/fykw/spyj/2002/10/10-06.htm; Lianzhuan 
Yang, Jian Du He Tong Fa 286 Tiao [Understanding of PRC Contract Law Article 286], at 
http://law.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/SLC/SLC.asp?Db=art&Gid=335564575; see also Zeng, supra note 
21. 
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reason for such practice of the court.  According to current procedural law, execution proceeding 
must be commenced with an enforceable judicial order, arbitration decision or obligation 
instrument certified by the notary public.  Thus, even though the contractor is entitled, under the 
Contract Law, to apply simply for an auction of the construction project, the court will still find it 
groundless, under the procedural law, to foreclose and sell the collateral if the contractor does not 
have the above documents.24  The substantive reason for the court’s view, as it seems to me, 
exists in the concern with potential mistakes in stepping into execution directly.  The trial 
proceeding, to a large degree, is used to guarantee that the substantive legal relationship between 
the contractor and the owner is as alleged by the contractor, and that the owner has exhausted all 
valid defenses against the contractor’s claim.  In short, it can only be determined through the trial 
proceeding whether a contractor’s priority right is ripe for execution. 
Courts’ position on the implementation of the priority right may lead to the situation 
where the contractor has no chance to enforce his priority right at all if not claiming it in the first 
place.  On the one hand, courts won’t voluntarily implement the right if not required by the 
contractor in the trial proceeding, while on the other hand the contractor cannot turn to the 
execution proceeding either, even if he attempts to enforce his priority right after a judgment is 
reached without mentioning it.  Moreover, the contractor may not be allowed to bring the case 
back to the trial court merely to add a claim for the priority right, because in a trial proceeding he 
must bring a suit against a defendant (i.e. the owner) and can’t only require a declaratory judgment 
                                                    
24  Yang, supra note 23, at 4. 
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for a right on certain property,25 but such a suit will be declined under the doctrine of res 
judicata.26 
 
B. Banks’ Reaction to the Law 
1. Banks’ Status Under the Law 
To explore banks’ reactions, we first need to understand the changes in their status since 
Article 286 and, especially, the Supreme Court Interpretation came into being. 
In urban real estate development projects,27 banks play a critical role in providing 
capitals.  Most owners28 raise fund through debt financing from banks.  In practice, owners 
apply for construction loans from banks and set mortgages on the land use right (of the land on 
which the project is to be constructed), as well as the forthcoming construction project,29 to secure 
the loans.  In case that owners default on paying the loans, the banks, as the mortgagees, may sell 
                                                    
25  The Civil Procedural Law of the People’s Republic of China, art 108 (2). 
26  This situation is illustrated by a case introduced in Zeng, supra note 21. 
27  In this paper, “urban real estate development project (Cheng Shi Fang Di Chan Kai Fa)” refers to one major 
type of construction projects in China.  According to Cheng Shi Fang Di Chan Kai Fa Jing Ying Guan Li 
Tiao Li [Administrative Regulation on Developing and Managing of Urban Real Estate Development 
Project], enacted by PRC Ministry of Development, developing and managing such projects is “an activity of 
constructing basic facilities and buildings in state-owned urban land, and transferring the development 
projects or selling, leasing residential properties.” (art. 2)  Actually, this is not a well-defined term yet 
frequently used in official as well as unofficial contexts.  In essence, it is basically used to distinguish with 
the governmental development project.  Urban real estate development projects are mainly financed through 
commercial capitals assembled by private developers.  Such projects are mostly residential and commercial 
buildings.  Developers transfer or lease the projects for profit.  In contrast, governmental development 
projects are financed through governmental budgets.  National or local governments act as the developer and 
the owner.  The projects are usually for public use. 
28  Usually but not necessarily, owners are also developers. 
29  The yet-to-be-built project is allowed to be mortgaged by Cheng Shi Fang Di Chan Di Ya Guan Li Ban Fa 
[Administrative Measures on Mortgage of Urban Real Estate Development Project], art. 3 and Zui Gao Ren 
Min Fa Yuan Guan Yu Shi Yong “Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Dan Bao Fa” Ruo Gan Wen Ti De Jie 
Shi [The Interpretation by the PRC Supreme People’s Court About the Problems Pertaining to the Application 
of PRC Secured Transaction Law], art. 47. 
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the collaterals and use the proceeds to satisfy their loan credits.  Moreover, as the bank is usually, 
if not always, the first creditor to set and perfect mortgage on urban real estate development 
projects and the incidental land use rights, before the appearance of Article 286 and the Supreme 
Court Interpretation, it will hold the first priority in the proceeds of sale under the “first in time, 
first in right” rule.30 
However, as stated above, the Supreme Court Interpretation permits the contractor to 
prevail over the bank in case of the owner’s default even if the contractor obtains the priority right 
after the bank became a mortgagee of the construction project and has never had the priority right 
perfected.  Obviously, banks’ status becomes more fragile with the establishment of the 
contractor’s priority right in current law.  The contractor does not need to record or otherwise 
perfect such right.  Neither is he required to give any notice to the previous mortgagee, the bank, 
before enforcing his right.  Therefore, unless investigating actively, the bank may be subordinate 
to the contractor even without knowledge.  If the proceeds of sale are less than the total amount 
of the contractor’s and the bank’s credits, the bank will essentially become an unsecured or 
partially unsecured creditor. 
Furthermore, if the owner and the contractor collude to defraud, the bank will confront 
even higher risks, and such collusion is relatively easy when the contractor is controlled by the 
owner or the contractor is essentially alter ego of the owner.31  The well-known “Cui Hu Shan 
                                                    
30 The Secured Transaction Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 54. 
31  There seems to be some merits in tax for such an alter ego arrangement.  See generally Xianfeng Zhou & 
Baizhou He, Gong Cheng Kuan You Xian Shou Chang Quan Xiang Guan Ge Fang Quan Li De Fa Lü Di Wei 
[The Legal Positions of the Parties Relevant to the Contractor’s Priority Right], 4 Jian Zhu Jing Ji 
[Construction Economy] 53, 54 (2004). 
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Zhuang” case, happening in Guangzhou, may serve as a good illustration of this kind of risk.  
Since the case was finally settled by arbitration, it has not been officially reported.  As appeared 
in news stories, the owner in this case defaulted on paying the construction loan to the bank, so the 
bank prepared to sell part of the construction project, the collateral of mortgage, in order to collect 
its non-performing loan.  Right after that, nonetheless, the contractor suddenly brought a suit 
against the owner for an alleged outstanding construction price.  It appears that the owner’s 
indebtedness to the contractor as determined by the arbitration tribunal was higher than the value 
of the collateral and that the contractor enjoyed a priority right with respect to this amount.  Thus, 
the bank, becoming a junior lien holder, lost the chance to collect its loan through judicial sale of 
the collateral.  Collusion might be suggested in this case by the fact that the contractor did not 
claim his construction price during the 2 years’ period since the completion of the construction 
work, when the owner’s financial situation was good enough to pay this price.32  Similar cases 
are said to arise in other places as well.33 
2. Potential Ways for Self-Protection 
Given the inferior status as described above, how can banks protect themselves?  Here 
follows an analysis about the potential ways for banks’ self-protection.  These measures might be 
                                                    
32  Wenqiang Zhang, Cui Hu Shan Zhuang Shi Jian Diao Cha: Kai Fa Shang Cheng Jian Shang He Mou Yin 
Hang? [Investigation of the Cui Hu Shan Zhuang Case: Collusion Between the Owner and the Contractor to 
Defraud the Bank?], 21 Shi Ji Jing Ji Bao Dao [21 Century Economy Reporter] (Jun. 21st, 2003), at 
http://house.focus.cn/newshtml/47772.html.  Yet it is unclear how the contractor managed to overcome the 
6-month requirement set by the Supreme Court Interpretation. 
33  See Yaming Gu, Qian Xi Gong Cheng Jia Kuan You Xian Quan De Yin Hang Feng Xian Fang Fan Dui Ce [A 
Preliminary Analysis to Banks’ Counter-Measures Against the Contractor’s Priority Right], 3 Zhong Guo 
Fang Di Chan Jin Rong [China Real Estate Finance] 25, 27 (2004) (A Nanjing case: contractors claiming 
priority right on unpaid construction price after the bank offsetting the construction loan with money in 
owner’s deposit account; the offset held to be invalid). 
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divided roughly into three categories. 
The first category is composed of devices aiming at circumventing the contractor’s 
priority right.  The easiest way for circumvention is to require contractors’ waiver.  Banks may 
provide in the construction loan agreements that the owner should require contractors to waive 
their priority rights in the future construction project.  Banks may also execute trilateral 
agreements with owners and contractors simultaneously, in which contractors promise a waiver.  
In current Chinese construction market, contractors are intensely competing for construction work 
while owners are generally short of construction funds.  Banks, therefore, are in advantageous 
positions to bargain for contract clauses in their favor.  It seems that some banks do take this 
approach to deal with the risks resulting from the contractor’s priority right.34  The dispute about 
the validity of such waiver, however, has not yet been settled.  In other words, if the court 
interprets Article 286 as a mandatory, rather than default, rule which couldn’t be changed by 
agreement, banks will still be subordinate to contractors.  In an early draft of a judicial 
interpretation,35 the Supreme Court explicitly permitted a prospective waiver clause.  Yet given 
that the bank can easily get such a clause from the contractor, Article 286 will become practically 
useless, if the court sanctions a waiver.  Conceivably out of this concern, the Supreme Court kept 
silent on this issue in the final version of its judicial interpretation promulgated recently.  So the 
                                                    
34  Zhou & He, supra note 31, at 55; see also Changhao Gu, Jian She Gong Cheng Cheng Bao Kuan De You 
Xian Shou Chang Quan [On the Contractor’s Priority Right] 12 Zheng Fu Fa Zhi Yan Jiu [Governmental 
Legal Study] 1, 9 (2000); this is also verified by my telephone interview with Jian Zhang, lawyer and 
specialist in construction law, Fujian Jun Li Law Firm, Beijing Office (Feb. 7th, 2005). 
35  Zui Gao Ren Min Fa Yuan Guan Yu Shen Li Jian She Gong Cheng Shi Gong He Tong Jiu Fen An Jian 
Shi Yong Fa Lü Ruo Gan Wen Ti De Jie Shi (Zheng Qiu Yi Jian Gao) [The Interpretation by the PRC 
Supreme People’s Court About the Problems Pertaining to the Adjudication of Construction Project Contract 
(Draft Soliciting Public Comments)] (hereafter, DSPC), art. 27. 
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bank still can’t safely rely on the contractor’s promise to waive the priority right. 
The other way for circumvention which might be approached by the bank is to take 
advantage of the proceeds of sale in the owner’s account.  Normally, the bank financing the 
construction project requests the owner to open an account in the same bank and any proceeds of 
the project shall be put into this account.  In case of the owner’s default, the bank may use the 
money in this account to offset the loan credit.  Under the current law, it is unclear whether the 
contractor’s priority right may extend to the proceeds of the collateral.  The bank, thus, can argue 
that the proceeds of the construction project are not covered by the priority right and can 
appropriately be used for offsetting.  However, it is still possible that the court will invalidate this 
practice.36 
With respect to residential properties in particular, usually the bank that advanced 
construction loans will also finance purchasers to buy the properties.  So banks can easily 
substitute the old construction loans with the new purchasing loans.  At the same time, since 
purchasers will also mortgage the purchased properties to the bank, the bank is fully secured with 
respect to the second kind of loans.  In addition, as the bank becomes a mortgagee of purchasers’, 
rather than contractors’ assets, its mortgage is not subordinate to the contractor’s priority right any 
more. 
The second category consists mainly of the defenses to be raised during litigation or 
execution proceedings.  When the contractor files an action to collect the construction price and 
claim the priority right, the bank, as the mortgagee of the construction project, may require to be 
                                                    
36  See, e.g. the case cited in Gu, supra note 33, at 27. 
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added as an “a third party with independent claims” in the litigation.37  Since the bank is the 
owner’s creditor, according to PRC Contract Law Article 73, it can arguably claim the owner’s 
defenses, in subrogation, against the contractor.  Defects and incompletion of the construction 
project might be the most obvious defenses in this regard.  Other defenses may challenge the 
scope of the construction price secured by the priority right (contractor’s profit is not covered, 
neither is his liability to third parties incidental to the construction work), or the scope of the 
collateral subject to such right (perhaps the land use right is not included).38  But it seems that 
these defenses can do no more than adjourning the execution of the priority right, or decreasing 
the amount the contractor may collect from the proceeds of sale.  And contractors can still claim 
the same right after repairing defects or completing construction projects.39 
In case that the contractor manages to enforce the priority right and auction off the 
construction project, the bank may also bid at the auction.  However, since the bank’s security 
interest is subject to the contractor’s priority right, the bank cannot merely offset the sale’s price 
with its loan credit but has to pay the contractor with real money.  In effect, the bank will buy out 
the priority right.  But on the other hand, the bank can join in the bidding to prevent the project 
                                                    
37  The Civil Procedural Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 56.  The bank may raise objections in the 
execution process (PRC Civil Procedural Law, art. 208). 
38  Yang Wei & Lihua Huang, He Tong Fa Di 286 Tiao Dui Yin Hang Xing Shi Di Ya Quan De Ying Xiang [The 
Influence of Contract Law Article 286 on Enforcement of the Bank’s Mortgage] 1 Hangzhou Jin Rong Yan 
Xiu Xue Yuan Xue Bao [Journal of ICBC Hangzhou Institute of Financial Managers] 46, 47 (2002). 
39  As Article 286 provided, the contractor can skip the auction process and merely “reach an agreement with” 
the owner “to convert the project into its monetary value”.  When such value is unreasonably 
underestimated, perhaps due to conspiracy, the bank, again as the owner’s creditor, can arguably require the 
court to nullify the agreement between the contractor and the owner according to PRC Contract Law, art. 74.  
But the bank has to prove that the value is “obviously unreasonable” and that the contractor also “has 
knowledge of this situation” (in essence, conspiracy must be shown), which is deemed to be hard to satisfy in 
practice (see Zhou & He, supra note 31, at 55). 
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being sold at an unreasonably low price.  Especially when the construction project, though 
potentially profitable if fully developed, is to be sold unfinished due to the owner’s shortage of 
funds, it might be desirable for the bank to take over the project and provide new money for 
further development. 
The third category is made up of various monitoring measures.  To minimize risks 
associated with the construction loan, banks may carefully screen the owner before advancing the 
construction loan, intensively monitor his conducts (especially use of money) during the 
construction process, and call the loans promptly in case of any default.  Actually, as the chief 
financier of the construction work, certain kind of monitoring is always supposed to be practiced 
by the bank, no matter whether the contractor’s priority right exists or not.  But it is said that 
banks are quite often neglectful of the monitoring task and excessively rely on mortgages for 
debt-collection.40  With the establishment of the contractor’s priority right, banks become less 
secure even under the protection of mortgages.  And this change in status is expected to give the 
bank more incentive to practice monitoring.41  While a detailed positive study on the change of 
banks’ monitoring incentive will be made in section III-B-2 below, it is intuitively true that more 
intensive monitoring would decrease the risks of construction loans, including those resulting from 
the contractor’s priority right. 
First of all, the bank may carefully select the owner and make loans only to those who 
                                                    
40  See Changhao Gu, Dui He Tong Fa Di 286 Tiao Si Fa Jie Shi De Ping Xi Yu Si Kao [Comments and 
Reflections on the Judicial Interpretation to PRC Contract Law Article 286] 4 Zheng Fu Fa Zhi Yan Jiu 
[Governmental Studies on Law] 1, 4 (2002). 
41  Id. 
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have a good potential in repaying all debts arising from the construction project.  Presumably, 
banks can make such selection on two principle bases.  First, they may investigate owners’ 
background information, especially their financial situations and credit history.  If the owner used 
to default in construction price or at the edge of insolvency, it might be very likely that the 
contractor will eventually enforce the priority right, thus the construction loan is subject to a high 
risk.  Second, banks may lend money only to those owners who have already had certain 
percentage of the construction funds.  In effect, this kind of requirement focuses on the owner’s 
own stake at the construction project.  The more money the owner takes out of his own pocket, 
the less likely he will take unreasonable risks in the project.42 
Indeed, banks are supposed to take these measures in selecting the potential borrowers.  
In 2003, the People’s Bank of China requires that commercial banks should lend construction 
loans to those owners without a history of default in construction prices and with an equity capital 
no less than 30% of the total funds needed for the construction project.43  In 2004, the PRC 
Banking Regulatory Commission also adopted similar regulations and further increased the equity 
capital requirement to 35%.44  In practice, however, banks may have difficulty having access to 
                                                    
42  The risk alteration problem will be discussed in section III-B-1 below. 
43  The People’s Bank of China, Zhong Guo Ren Min Yin Hang Guan Yu Jin Yi Bu Jia Qiang Fang Di 
Chan Xin Dai Ye Wu Guan Li De Tong Zhi [Circular on Further Strengthening the Management of Real 
Estate-Related Credit Businesses], art. 1.  Some commentators believe that this circular was, at least in 
part, stimulated by the risks arising from the contractor’s priority right (Zhou & He, supra note 31, at 
54). 
44  PRC Banking Regulatory Commission, Shang Ye Yin Hang Fang Di Chan Dai Kuan Feng Xian Guan 
Li Zhi Yin [Guidelines on Risk Management by Commercial Banks Regarding Real Estate Loans], art.16.  
It is unclear whether these requirements are direct reactions to the contractor’s priority right.  Similar 
requirements seemingly existed even before the Supreme Court Interpretation which subordinates 
banks’ mortgages to the priority right.  However, it is still noticeable that both of the two 
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owners’ background information.  No well-established credit history reporting system exists in 
most places of the country.  In addition, some owners are organized temporarily for the 
development of a specific project and may dissolve soon after the project is completed.  In some 
places, Shanghai for example, the local government publishes periodically the name list of those 
owners with a bad history of default on construction prices.45  Conceivably such information may 
help banks select owners when making loan decisions.  Investigation is yet to be done as for the 
commercial bank’s compliance with above regulations. 
Second, banks may diligently monitor owners’ usage of construction funds during the 
developing process.  It appears that the loan agreement usually specifies the bank’s right to check 
and monitor the usage of the loan, and may also entitle the bank to examine the debtor’s 
accounting books as well as other financial records.46  In addition, the PRC Banking Regulatory 
Commission also required commercial banks to set up a monitoring system and keep aware of any 
changes of the owner, contractor or the construction project.47  Again it is unclear whether banks 
are exercising their monitoring rights effectively in reality.  Some materials suggest that, at least 
before the appearance of Article 286, banks did poorly in monitoring the usage of construction 
                                                                                                                                                          
administrative entities in charge of the commercial banks reiterated these requirements in their recent 
regulations adopted after the Supreme Court Interpretation. 
45  Yi Zhang, Shanghai Cong Yuan Tou Du Jue Gong Cheng Kuan Tuo Qian; Chou Jian Jian Zhu Min Gong 
Gong Zi Zhuan Hu [Shanghai Preventing the Default on Construction Prices From the Origin; Preparing to 
Establish Special Accounts for Construction Workers’ Remunerations] (Aug. 14th, 2004), 
at http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004-08/14/content_1781708.htm (published originally in Jie Fang 
Ri Bao [Jie Fang Daily]). 
46  E.g. The Model Loan Contract of China Construction Bank, art. 5. 
47  Supra note 44, art. 20. 
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loans.48 
Furthermore, though construction loans advanced on term basis, these terms are not 
necessarily connected with the progress in construction work.49  Some lawyers suggested that, in 
order to minimize the risks associated with the contractor’s priority right, banks should condition 
each advance of the loan on the owners’ timely payment of construction prices.  But banks may 
deem such suggestion as impractical.  It is said that banks “don’t have effective methods at all to 
investigate whether (the owner) has defaulted in paying construction price” since “the value of the 
project under construction is changing all the time and banks have difficulty in keeping accurate 
track of the ever-changing construction price”.50  In practice, the price agreed in construction 
project contract is no more than an estimate.  Thus, although the construction price is supposed to 
be paid to the contractor periodically during the construction process, such payment is also based 
on estimation.  The real price cannot be settled until the final accounting which will be made 
after completion of the construction work.51  Put in another way, even if the owner made every 
periodic payment to the contractor in strict accordance to the contract, chances still exist that part 
of the construction price will be in default.  Essentially, except that the loans were advanced after 
                                                    
48  Gu, supra note 40, at 4. 
49  The Banking Regulatory Commission provides that “banks may advance construction loans on term basis 
according to the progress of the project” (see supra note 44, art. 20). 
50  Kunfeng Zhu, Fang Dai Feng Xian Tu Xian Guangzhou Yin Hang Ye Dongguan Mi Shang Dui Ce [Risk in 
Construction Loans Increasing; Bankers in Guangzhou Discussing Measures to Cope at Dongguan] (Jun. 
17th, 2003), at http://news.xinhuanet.com/house/2003-06/17/content_923451.htm (originally published in Jing 
Ji Guan Cha Bao [Newspaper of Economic Observation]). 
51  Telephone interview with Yunwei Chen, vice manger-in-chief, Shanghai Zhu Le Construction Development 
Company (Nov. 12th, 2004). 
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final accounting, banks could never be sure about whether default existed and the volume of 
indebtedness.  But if so, construction loan wouldn’t be necessary in the first place.  In my 
opinion, however, conditioning the loan advance on owner’s strict compliance with the payment 
clause in construction project contract may reasonably reduce these risks associated with the 
priority right, even if this cannot completely eliminate these risks.  At least, noncompliance with 
the contract clause will be a good sign of increased risk and banks should take extra care before 
making further advances. 
Finally, to ensure that the contractor is properly paid, thus lowering the probability of the 
enforcement of the contractor’s priority right, banks may advance construction loans directly to 
the contractor instead of the owner.52  This can be seen as another way to monitor the usage of 
loans.  In effect, it also means that the bank pays construction price instead of the owner.  
However, it seems that banks seldom resort to this monitoring method.   The reason is said to 
exist partly in banks’ contractual duties.  It is the owner, not the contractor, who reached the loan 
agreement with the bank therefore the bank owes its duty of advancing loans to the owner.53  
Nevertheless, to overcome this hurdle, the bank may also have the owner promise in the loan 
contract that the advance can be made to the contractor.  A more creditable explanation is that 
owners need to use the loan for other reasonable purposes apart from paying contractors.  Given 
the current situations in Chinese construction market, however, such purposes are not so obvious.  
Since contractors not only provide working hands but also pay a substantial portion of material 
                                                    
52  A similar suggestion is made that the bank reaches loan agreement directly with the contractor and the owner 
serves as a guarantee (supra note 50). 
53  Telephone interview with Junhua Miao, Bank of Communications, Shanghai Branch (Mar. 2nd, 2005). 
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costs in advance for owners,54 it appears that most of the construction loan would reach 
contractors sooner or later.  Conceivably, there might be two other major expenses relevant to 
construction projects.  The first is the price of land use right.  As the owner is not allowed to 
apply for construction loans before obtaining the land use right, he must collect funds from other 
sources to pay this price.  It is said that owners would borrow short term loans from other entities 
(e.g. overseas investors), or from banks but in other pretexts, to cover this price.  Once the 
construction loan is approved by the bank, the owner will repay those short term loans with the 
new money provided by the bank.55  The second expense which is not covered by the 
construction price is the cost for relocating the current residents.  This usually is a substantial cost 
to the owner.  In urban redevelopment projects, it is the municipal government that grants the 
land use right and charges the land use right fee.  However, generally the government won’t bear 
the financial burden to resettle the residents living on that land.  So the owner must collect funds 
for these expenses as well.  Is that the reason why banks do not advance loans to the contractor?  
Further investigation might be needed.  Although banks rarely advance construction loans 
directly to contractors, some banks are said to request written acknowledgement by contractors 
before advancing loans to owners.56  This condition plays more or less the same role as direct 
advance to contractors.  It gives contractors notice that money is arriving.  Above all, owners 
are more likely to pay contractors with construction loans in order to obtain their 
acknowledgement. 
                                                    
54  Interview with Chen, supra note 51.  See also Gu, supra note 34, at 8. 
55  Interview with Zhang, supra note 34. 
56  Telephone interview with Hao Kuang, attorney at law, Beijing Gong He Law Firm, Shanghai Office (Dec. 
18th, 2004). 
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Among the above three categories, the first and the last seem to be substitutionary to each 
other while the second is supplementary, mainly, to the last one.  If the bank can circumvent the 
priority right it need not take much trouble to monitor the owner.  In contrast, if the effective 
monitoring is practical then the bank may cope with the risk associated with the priority right even 
without circumvention.  In addition, when circumvention is allowed, the ex post litigation or 
execution strategies are likely to be unnecessary.  In terms of monitoring, nevertheless, these 
strategies might be applicable when risk cannot be eliminated entirely.  Predictably, banks will 
choose rationally among these potential methods based on cost-benefit considerations.  As 
indicated above, under current market situations, the cost for circumvention is comparatively low.  
Moreover, circumventing methods can totally eliminate the risk arising from the priority right 
while monitoring usually cannot, thus may further involve costs for taking measures in the second 
category.  Therefore, if the court makes favorable decisions on circumventing strategies, banks 
will do no more monitoring than they did before the adoption of the contractor’s priority right. 
Besides, interest will play its role as an implement to balance the loan risk as usual.  
With the increased risk, the interest rate of the construction loan is expected to rise accordingly and 
any monitoring cost or other transaction costs will also be reflected in the interest rate.  In this 
sense, circumventing measures, if allowed, is more desirable than monitoring measures even to the 
owner.  When banks cannot effectively raise the interest rate high enough to cover the risk as 
well as other costs, due to state regulations or market competition perhaps, they will choose to step 
out of the construction loan market, as reported by some writers.57 
                                                    
57  Gu, supra note 33, at 27. 
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C. Problems Confronted by the Contractor 
The legal design of the priority right will directly affect contractors’ incentive to enforce 
the right.  In addition, courts’ positions on application of the law and banks’ reactions to these 
positions will also exert impact on such incentive, which may dilute the effectiveness of the 
contractor’s priority right.  The problems to be discussed below will presumably chill 
contractors’ avidity of invoking Article 286. 
1. Pre-conditions on the Contractor’s Priority Right 
Article 286 and the Supreme Court Interpretation set up two major pre-conditions on the 
contractor’s priority right: completion of the construction work and demand for payment.  
Contractors cannot enforce such right until these conditions are met.  However, neither of the two, 
as provided by the law, is clear enough to warrant a smooth enforcement by the contractor.  The 
vagueness of law might bring about substantial difficulties in practice. 
The first condition, completion of work, is not explicitly stated in Article 286.  The 
Supreme Court Interpretation has no straight indication of it as such a condition either.  The latter, 
nonetheless, does say that “the statute of limitations of the priority right is 6 months, running from 
the date of the completion of the construction work”.  Literally, completion is but one starting 
point58 of the statute of limitations, which essentially stipulates the latest point of time to enforce 
the right but does not necessarily set restriction on the earliest point of time to do so.  Yet it is 
                                                    
58  Another starting point is “the completion date as stipulated in the construction project contract”. 
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apparently understood, both by scholars59 and practitioners,60 that, as a general rule, completion 
is a prerequisite for enforcement of the contractor’s priority right. 
It seems quite natural that the contractor must complete his work before asking for the 
construction price, therefore the priority right, as a security of this price, should be enforceable no 
earlier than that time.  But here “completion” is a word filled with ambiguity.  At least two 
different meanings have been attached to this word in practice.  One is “completion and transfer”, 
and the other “completion and inspection”.61  The former is a process “for parties of the 
construction project contract, viz. the owner and the contractor, to mutually approve the 
performance of the contract” and the possession of the project will be transferred from the 
contractor to the owner accordingly.  The latter, on the other hand, refers to the administrative 
approval procedure based on the “completion and transfer” process, and its purpose is to examine 
whether the construction project complies with various administrative regulations.62  In fact, the 
former may be viewed as a private approval of completion while the latter an official approval.  
In either case, it seems completion cannot be declared unilaterally by the contractor.  These two 
kinds of approval can be obtained simultaneously or separately.63  When they are not obtained at 
the same time, the problem will arise as to which should be regarded as a condition on 
                                                    
59  See, e.g., Liang, supra note 6, at 377. 
60  See, e.g., Andong Ye, Shui Lai Xing Shi You Xian Shou Chang Quan [Who Should Enforce the Contractor’s 
Priority Right?] 8 Zhong Guo Lü Shi [China Lawyer] 56, 56 (2004) (The author is a judge of Guangzhou 
Huangpu District People’s Court); Gu, supra note 40, at 7 (The author is the vice-director of the Law and 
Regulation Office of Shanghai Municipal Government). 
61  Gu, supra note 40, at 6; Ye, supra note 60, at 56. 
62  Gu, supra note 40, at 6. 
63  Id. at 6. 
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enforcement of the contractor’s priority right.  Courts are said to split on this matter64 and some 
commentators suggest that the completion requirement for enforcing the contractor’s priority right 
refers to “completion and transfer”, not “completion and inspection”.65 
So long as “completion and transfer” is required before contractors can enforce their 
priority right, they cannot claim this right without first abandoning possession of the construction 
project.  However, it is said to be a common practice that contractors hold possession (usually by 
holding keys) to impel owners to pay the construction price as agreed.66  Thus, giving up the 
possession will restrict contractors’ capability of self-defense against owners for potential defaults.  
Of course, to the extent that the priority right could effectively help contractors collect construction 
prices, possession of the construction projects would not be essential any longer.  Yet the real 
functioning of the priority right deserves some further inquiry.  Moreover, as stated above, the 
exact amount of the construction price remains unknown until the final accounting made after 
“completion and inspection”.67   In other words, even if contractors are allowed to enforce the 
priority right after “completion and transfer”, the amount of the credit secured by this right is still 
unclear.  Therefore, it might be practically senseless to interpret the completion requirement as 
“completion and transfer”. 
On the other hand, “completion and inspection” may also meet difficulty if taken as a 
condition to enforce the priority right.  As it is usually the owner who should organize the 
                                                    
64  Ye, supra note 60, at 56. 
65  Gu, supra note 40, at 7, but the reason is not specified. 
66  Interview with Chen, supra note 51. 
67  Interview with Chen, supra note 51; see also Ye, supra note 60, at 56. 
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inspection, the contractor will be left in a weak stance if the owner unduly defers this process.68  
Arguably, under such circumstances, the contractor may exercise his priority right when “the 
completion date as stipulated in the construction project contract” arrives and unilaterally claim 
the construction price without final accounting.69 
If we look at the actual process in construction project contracts, however, neither of the 
two meanings attached to “completion” is necessarily connected with due dates of the construction 
price.  In short, in a real construction scenario, the payments of such price are made as follows: 
Estimate the total price and write it down in the contract ⇒  
Pay a certain percentage70 of the estimated price as an advance payment ⇒ 
Pay part of the remaining price periodically during the construction process ⇒ 
Completion and transfer ⇒ inspection ⇒ final accounting and settling the total price ⇒ 
Compute the outstanding price = total price - the amount paid ⇒ 
Pay part of the outstanding price and keep the rest as warranty fee ⇒ 
Pay the warranty fee if no material defects arise after a certain period.71 72 
Actually, default on payment may occur in any step of the process, either before or after 
completion.  Given that completion is a pre-condition, when the owner fails to pay the price, as 
agreed in the contract, before completion, the contractor must complete the construction work 
with his own money in order to meet the “completion” requirement.  On the other hand, if the 
                                                    
68  Ye, supra note 60, at 56. 
69  Id., at 56. 
70  In Shanghai, for example, it’s usually 30%. 
71  In Shanghai, this period is usually 1 or 2 years. 
72  This process is summarized based on the interview with Chen, supra note 51; Gu, supra note 40, at 6; and Ye, 
supra note 60, at 56. 
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owner defaults in paying the warranty fee when it is due, very likely the priority right can no 
longer be enforced because the statute of limitations has already run.  Since the contractor’s 
priority right is security to the construction price it should be enforceable when each part of this 
price becomes due regardless of completion. 73   So the completion requirement appears 
incompatible with the construction practice. 
When the owner defaults on construction price before completion and the contractor 
cannot continue the construction work at his own expense, the contractor, according to the 
Supreme Court Interpretation, has to wait until the completion date prescribed in the contract, if he 
wants to rely on the priority right for collection of the price.  However, without invoking Article 
286, the contractor can immediately sue the owner for damages, either under PRC Contract Law 
Article 107, as an actual default on payment for a given term, or arguably under Article 108 of the 
same law, as an anticipatory default on payment of the whole construction price.  In other words, 
though there is actionable breach of contract, the contractor still has to wait for the ripening of the 
priority right, a piece of instrument securing his contractual rights.74  Again, the rationale for this 
wait-until-completion-date rule remains unknown.  But one thing is known: this rule makes the 
priority right less favorable to contractors, as they are now forced to defer from collecting the 
construction prices. 
Finally, the demand requirement raises the question as to what is “a reasonable period of 
time” the contractor must wait before the priority right can be enforced.  Given the 6-month 
                                                    
73  Ye, supra note 60, at 56. 
74  Remember that the court, in practice, will not enforce the contractor’s priority right unless it is claimed in his 
suit to collect the construction price. 
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statute of limitations provided by the Supreme Court Interpretation, such period should be no 
more than 6 months.  Some practitioners suggest that, as a usage of the construction industry, this 
period should be 8 weeks or 56 days.75  Usually, reasonableness depends on specific situations 
and may only be determined case by case.  However, this may well become another ground for 
owners to challenge the enforceability of the contractor’s priority right, which can further defer its 
enforcement. 
2. Scope of the Priority Right: Is the Contractor Fully Protected? 
Article 286 does not delineate the scope of the construction price secured by the 
contractor’s priority right, while the Supreme Court Interpretation limited the scope to 
“remunerations of employees, materials fees and such other expenses that the contractor actually 
paid for construction work” (emphasis added). 
From a practical perspective, this scope roughly covers the “cost” of the construction 
work, consisting of, in construction industry’s terminology, direct fees and indirect fees.76  
Obviously, profit is not protected by the priority right.  Like other business enterprises, 
construction contractor aims at making profits.  Hence, at first glance, it seems really weird to 
leave these profits beyond the protection of priority right, if the law is targeted at safeguarding the 
contractor’s interest.  But, as mentioned above, given that the court believes the major task of the 
priority right is laborer-protection, the exclusion of profit becomes quite understandable.  Indeed, 
the focus of the court, regardless of the legislative objective, is on ensuring proper payment of 
                                                    
75  Zhu, supra note 10, at 47. 
76  “Direct fee” refers to the expenses arising directly from the construction work, e.g. material cost, labor cost 
and the cost of preparatory work.  “Indirect fee” refers mainly to the monitoring cost of the construction 
work and is usually calculated as a certain percentage of the direct fee. 
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wages to laborers.  The contractor is bestowed with the priority right merely because, at least in 
principle, he is the employer of laborers who directly pays these wages.  And the coverage of 
actual costs, such as material costs, can be explained that otherwise the contractor will apply the 
money obtained through enforcing the priority right to offset these costs.  Therefore, insufficient 
protection to the contractor is a good reflection of the judicial purpose of laborer-protection. 
However, it is doubtful, under such a scheme, whether the contractor would have enough 
incentive to claim the priority right.  Especially when the construction cost is largely financed by 
other participants – laborers and material providers, for example, the contractor could hardly be 
expected to enforce this right at his own expense merely to satisfy these credits.  If material costs 
(or other actual construction expenses) are paid out of the contractor’s pocket, then, in order to 
recover these fees, he may be spurred to claim the priority right.  In this situation, the labor cost, 
which is usually credited by laborers, can also be reimbursed with the proceeds of sale of the 
construction project.  In general, the more expenses, other than labor cost, the contractor has 
advanced with his own money, the better incentive he will have to enforce the priority right, thus, 
also higher chance for laborers to get their wages.  In this sense, laborers can be fairly regarded as 
free-riders of the contractor’s enforcement.  Once the contractor advances a substantial amount 
of money (larger than the expected enforcement cost) for construction costs, he will be willing to 
enforce the priority right even if the profit cannot get paid with the proceeds of sale.  But this can 
be said only after the contractor did put his money into the construction project, thus getting his 
own stake involved.  If we examine the contractor’s incentive ex ante, however, things may be 
different.  Now that profits do not fall in the sweep of the priority right, this right adds nothing to 
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the contractor’s incentive to advance construction costs in the first place.  No rational contractor, 
as a business entity, will be more willing to make such advances just because he might get secured 
to take back the same amount of money in the future (probably even without interest) while 
reaping no profit at all.  Moreover, considering the free-rider problem in enforcing the priority 
right, a rational contractor tend to seek credits from others, e.g. material providers, to finance the 
construction costs, if he can’t be prepaid by the owner.  If the contractor does not advance the 
construction costs with his own funds, as mentioned above, he will not be sufficiently incentivized 
to enforce the priority right, which means laborers will not have a free-ride either.  Actually, 
under the current legal structural, since laborer-protection can only be realized indirectly through 
contractor-protection, any distortion in the contractor’s incentive will curtail the efforts to protect 
laborers as well. 
 
3. Exemption from the Priority Right: A Barrier That Matters 
According to Article 286, if a construction project, in light of its nature, “is not suited to 
being converted into its monetary value or auctioned off”, then it is exempted from the 
contractor’s priority right.  What kind of projects bears such a nature?  As listed by most 
commentators, this category may include state-sponsored major projects – such as highways, 
bridges, governmental buildings – and the projects with special purposes – such as school or 
hospital buildings.77  In practice, virtually no governmental development project will be subject 
                                                    
77  See Hu, supra note 19, at 439; Jiang, supra note 4, at 224; Research Office, supra note 19, at 422; see also 
DSPC, supra note 35, art. 23. 
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to the contractor’s priority right.  On one hand, there might be legal restrictions in transferability 
of state-owned projects, while on the other, these projects, usually as facilities for public service, 
appear to be less attractive to private investors.  Imagine, in China, who will bid for the National 
Opera Hall or the highway connecting Beijing and Shanghai when the usage fee structure is 
heavily restricted by the state?  As for schools and hospitals, those who purchase their physical 
architecture may also be obliged to provide relevant services accordingly. 
From contractors’ perspective, these exempted projects will amount to substantial barriers 
because a great portion of outstanding construction prices arise from these projects.  According 
to official statistics, as of 2004, the total construction price that is outstanding for completed 
construction projects amounts to $21.4 billion, among which the governmental indebtedness is 
above $7.8 billion or 36.6%.78  A numerical comparison will shed more light.  The number of 
indebtedness arising from urban real estate development projects is $5.7 billion or 26.6%.79  So 
with respect to completed construction projects, governmental default is 10% more than the 
default by developers in urban real estate market (available statistics do not show who owes the 
remaining 36.8% construction prices).  In terms of transferability, however, there is little doubt 
that urban real estate development projects, consisting mainly of residential and commercial 
properties, are best fit for the contractor’s priority right.  In other words, of the whole 
construction price default problem, Article 289 can merely solve 26.6% the best, while at least 
36.6% can barely be addressed by this article.  Some other resources hinted that the state-owed 
                                                    
78  See supra note 2. 
79  Zeng Pei Yan Fu Zong Li Zai Quan Guo Qing Li Tuo Qian Gong Cheng Kuan Dian Shi Hui Yi Shang De 
Jiang Hua [The Address by Vice Premier Zeng Pei Yan at the National Video Conference on Collection of 
Indebted Construction Prices] (Aug. 23rd, 2004). 
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construction prices may be even more.  For instance, one material said that the 49.5% of the total 
defaulted construction price arose from the so-called “basic infrastructure construction projects”.80  
In China, this category can squarely fall in the scope of state-sponsored major projects. 
In fact, not only the legally exempted projects but any construction projects that can’t be 
easily transferred in market are beyond the reach of the contractor’s priority right.  Suppose a 
factory built a new building on its premises and the construction price was in default.  Even if 
this factory building is not exempted under Article 286, it’s still hard to imagine that outside 
investors would be interested in bidding for such a building as completely encircled by the factory.  
Apparently, the contractor’s priority right is best geared with urban real estate development 
projects but relatively incapable of dealing with legally or practically non-transferable projects.  
However, it seems that the former is also less likely to yield construction fee defaults, especially 
when the urban real estate market is in a boom.  In such a market, the owner (also the developer) 
has less incentive to default for fear of losing the profitable projects.  Further, with a smooth 
cash-flow from purchasers, owners hold enough capability to pay construction prices, too.81  If 
that is true, then the contractor’s priority right turns out to be, at most, a medicine that cures the 
least likely disease while leaving those more widespread ones untouched. 
4. Subordination to Consumer’s Right: A Potential Trap 
                                                    
80  Zhou & He, supra note 31, at 55. 
81  This prediction seems supported by my interview with Chen, supra note 51, in which Mr. Chen told me that 
among the construction projects his company engaged in, urban real estate development projects rarely yield 
construction price defaults in recent years.  But there also exists contrary evidences.  It is said that as for 
Shanghai Jian Gong Group, one of the biggest construction enterprise in Shanghai, 52.3% outstanding 
construction prices are attributable to urban real estate development projects (Gu, supra note 34, at 7).  Yet it 
might worth inquiring the occurring time of such indebtedness and further exploring the market situation at 
relevant periods. 
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The Supreme Court Interpretation subordinates contractor’s priority right to consumer’s 
ownership of the residential property, if the consumer has paid majority of the purchase price.  In 
practice, most purchasers of residential properties (mainly condominiums) get purchasing loans 
(normally up to 80% of the total price) from banks and pay the whole price to the owner in a lump 
sum (properties so purchased are mortgaged to banks).  Thus, paying the majority of the 
purchase price won’t be a big problem for purchasers.  On the other hand, “consumer” is a tricky 
word in this context.  Literally, it is supposed to mean the purchasers who buy residential 
properties for living.  If the real estate is bought for purposes other than living, say, for lease or 
resale, then the purchaser is no longer a “consumer”, but an investor or speculator.  In reality, 
however, such purpose-oriented classification doesn’t seem to work, probably due to the difficulty 
in determining purchasers’ exact purposes.  Therefore, in effect, it appears that virtually any 
purchaser of residential real estate will be regarded as a consumer.  Since these two requirements, 
paying majority of the price and purchasing as a consumer, will almost always be met without 
trouble, there is a high probability that the contractor’s priority right will be subordinated with 
respect to residential construction projects. 
A prevalent justification for such subordination is the consumer-protection policy.  As 
Professor Huixing Liang stated, in such case, the contractor’s business interest should be 
subordinate to the consumer’s living interest.82  Yet this kind of subordination constitutes a 
                                                    
82  Liang, supra note 6, at 379.  Obviously, here Professor Liang is deeply influenced by the Japanese 
“balancing of interest” theory, which ranks interests of various parties and provides legal protection 
accordingly.  From these comments, he appears to take a contractor-protection position as the objective of 
Article 286, but in the same paper Professor Liang also admits that the rationale for Article 286, at least in part, 
exists at protecting the laborer’s compensations.  Anyway, if the contractor’s priority right is regarded 
mainly as a laborer-protection mechanism, it also involves living interest (of laborers) in addition to business 
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potential trap to the contractor.  In short, the owner may collude with purchasers to escape 
payment of the construction price.  One case in this point is as follows.  B, the owner, defaulted 
on construction price and the contractor, A, threatened to bring a suit.  B immediately sold all of 
the 46 residential units in the construction project to C, a related company, and required C to pay 
the purchase price to bank D, where B got the construction loan.  D then offset its loan with the 
purchase price.  At the same time, C quickly resold the residential units to individual purchasers 
and conveyed titles.  After A won his suit against B and attempted to enforce the contractor’s 
priority right, he ultimately found that nothing can be auctioned off at all.83  Actually, even 
without collusion, the contractor’s interest may still be at risk.  As mentioned above, partly as a 
circumvention practice, banks that advanced construction loans to owners would require them to 
maintain an account in the same bank and use this account to collect the proceeds of sale of the 
residential projects.  Then banks would offset the construction loans with the proceeds in this 
account.84  In current Chinese real estate market, a substantial part of residential properties are 
sold out before completion of construction, when the contractor is not yet entitled to enforce his 
priority right.  Therefore, even if the contractor intends to claim this right after completion, his 
efforts could fall through because he might be left with neither the property nor the proceeds. 
5. Other Problems 
Apart from the abovementioned issues, the contractor will encounter still other problems 
                                                                                                                                                          
interest. 
83  Lanchun Zhu, Fa Ding You Xian Shou Chang Quan De Luo Kong [The Falling Through of the Contractor’s 
Priority Right] (2002), at 
http://law.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/SLC/SLC.asp?Db=art&Gid=335545082 . 
84  Gu, supra note 33, at 28; telephone interview with Kuang Duan, Professor of Law and specialist in secured 
transaction law, Fudan University School of Law (Dec. 12th, 2004). 
 38 
 
that may frustrate his efforts to seek protection under Article 286.  One problem exists in the 
enforcement procedure of the priority right and it can be a time-consuming process.  As I have 
pointed out in section II-1-B, courts require the contractor to go through all trial proceedings and 
obtain an ultimate judgment before applying for execution of the priority right.  With all the 
defenses that can be used by both the owner and his creditor, the bank, the trial itself might be a 
long race.  Even when this process goes on smoothly and the execution application is promptly 
approved, the auction process will cost the contractor another months of time.  In practice, before 
the auction can be made, the value of the construction project must be assessed and auction 
advertisement published in major local newspapers.  If bidders do appear and the project is really 
sold at the auction, it will take at least 2 months to go through the whole process: evaluation → 
advertising → auction.85  However, it is said that, very often, bidders do not actively attend and 
bid at auctions.86  In that case, the auction may be suspended for 1 or 2 years before a new round 
can be called, and under certain circumstances, the execution judges even have to seek bidders 
personally.  When the project to be auctioned off is incomplete (the circumstance under which 
the contractor is entitled to enforce his right when the completion date stipulated in the contract 
comes), it is particularly troublesome to find purchasers and may take as long as several years to 
get the auction, if ever, settled.87 
Such a time-consuming process is common to all real estate execution cases, no matter 
                                                    
85  Telephone interview with Xiumin Qin, Judge, Tianjin Dagang District People’s Court (Nov. 16th, 2004). 
86  Tiehua Liu, Guan Yu Cheng Bao Ren Gong Cheng Kuan You Xian Quan De Cao Zuo Nan Dian [The 
Practical Difficulties in the Contractor’s Priority Right] 3 Jian Zhu Jing Ji [Construction Economy] 30, 31 
(2000). 
87  Interview with Qin, supra note 85. 
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based on the priority right or not.  As for contractors, or more specifically their laborers, 
nevertheless, it will turn out to be a critical problem.  Under the current compensation system, 
construction laborers are usually paid with a small amount of stipends during the year, and the 
major part of their annual wages will be paid at the end of the lunar year.88  Construction laborers, 
mainly coming from the countryside, will bring their annual incomes back to hometowns during 
the spring festival holidays.  If laborers cannot get wages due to the owner’s default, they won’t 
be able or willing to go back home at the spring festival, which, under traditional Chinese culture, 
can be a really big issue to the laborer, his or her family, as well as the society.  Therefore, 
although a time-consuming process of collecting debts is generally undesirable to creditors, the 
timing of getting paid may be exceedingly sensitive to construction laborers. 
The last concern I want to mention is contractors’ fear of worsening their relationship 
with owners.  In current Chinese construction market, contractors are believed to be at an inferior 
position to the owner.  The fundamental reason for this inferiority exists in the fact that too many 
contractors are competing for relatively few construction projects. 89   Thus, the market 
mechanism tips the scale in owners’ favor.  If the contractor dares to claim the priority right, it 
may well mean that he has broken the relationship with the owner and could not get business from 
the same owner in future.  Under the so-called “rolling development” scheme, quite popular at 
present, one owner will develop a huge project that is further divided into several subprojects.  
These subprojects will be developed one after another.  Sometimes, the owner won’t pay the 
                                                    
88  Interview with Chen, supra note 51. 
89  Jianjun Dong, He Tong Fa Di 286 Tiao Ruo Gan Fa Lü Wen Ti Tan Tao [Discussions About Several Legal 
Problems in PRC Contract Law Article 286] 12 Jin Rong Lun Tan [Financial Forum] 24, 26 (2002); see also 
Gu, supra note 34, at 9. 
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construction price of the first subproject until the completion of the second one.90  If the 
contractor breaks his relationship with the owner at an earlier phase, he might lose potential profits 
in all subsequent phases.  Even if the contractor does not expect to continue the relationship with 
a certain owner, his fame of aggressively enforcing the priority right might spread in the industry, 
thus affecting the contractor’s future business opportunities.  Exactly for these reasons, 
contractors are fairly ready to agree to waive their priority rights.91  Some commentators 
sympathetically call for contractors to take stronger position against owners,92 nevertheless, this 
sympathy seems short of a sound business sense. 
 
D. Is the Contractor More Secure: Summary of the Functional Analysis 
In the previous sections, I have attempted to review the actual positions of some key 
players under the Article 286 scheme.  In principle, this scheme is designed to strengthen the 
contractor’s status against the owner and stimulate the latter to appropriately pay the construction 
price.  In essense, however, it readjusts the interests between the contractor and other creditors of 
the owner, mainly, the bank and the purchaser.  As a result of this legal design, the priority among 
these parties now becomes: the purchase (if as a consumer) in the first and the bank in the last.  
With respect to the owner, his position remains practically unchanged.  That is because no matter 
the contractor’s priority right exists or not, the construction project, as the most easily identifiable 
asset of the owner, is almost always subject to repossession and sale in case of default on 
                                                    
90  Interview with Duan, supra note 85. 
91  See references in supra note 34. 
92  Gu, supra note 34, at 9. 
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construction prices.  The difference merely exists at the order of distributing the auction price 
among his creditors.  Partly for this reason, I dispensed with exploring the owner’s reactions to 
the contractor’s priority right. 93 
Then, is the contractor more secure because of the priority right?  With promotion of 
status against the bank, the contractor is supposed to be more secure in that more proceeds will be 
distributed to him if the construction project is sold.  But this result only arises where the 
contractor’s priority right can be and is really enforced.  This will further depend on courts’ 
interpretation, banks’ strategy and contractors’ incentive.  Under the current system, I would 
conclude tentatively that the priority right is not totally favorable to the contractor.  It seems that 
courts are not ready to extend full protection to the contractor and banks will prefer circumventing 
measures to fend off the priority right.  Above all, the market mechanism also works against the 
contractor.  Even if the contractor’s priority right can be rightly applied, it is still noteworthy that 
it can tackle no more than the construction projects legally and practically transferable.  Perhaps 
due to all these qualifications, an insider of the construction industry cautiously reminded his 
colleagues that before resorting to the contractor’s priority right for collecting construction prices, 
“the feasibility must be well studied and absolutely should not (enforce this right) at will”.94  To 
do or not to do – it is really a problem. 
Finally, as for courts’ (maybe also legislators’) objective of protecting laborers, it should 
be mentioned that, by all means, this is at most a side-effect of the contractor’s priority right.  To 
                                                    
93  Another reason is lack of relevant materials. 
94  Liu, supra note 87, at 31.  The author is an officer of Shanghai Jian Gong Group, Inc., a giant construction 
enterprise in Shanghai. 
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what extent it can be realized largely relies on how well the contractor is actually protected under 
Article 286.  Even if the contractor is more secure, the laborers are not necessarily better 
protected, either, as the money goes directly to the contractor’s pocket and he may apply it for 
purposes other than paying laborers’ wages. 
 
III. SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE CONTRACTOR’S PRIORITY RIGHT 
UNDER THE PRC CONTRACT LAW 
A. Policy Arguments for the Contractor’s Priority Right 
“First in time, first in right”, that is the basic rule about the priority of security interests 
under Chinese law.  Then, why should the contractor enjoy a statutory lien that prevails over 
even mortgages perfected earlier?  There are two major policy arguments frequently mentioned 
by Chinese commentators. 
First, it is said that a substantial part of the construction price is composed of laborers’ 
wages.  So the priority right is chiefly aimed at laborer-protection, which stands for a significant 
public policy.  This argument wins strong support from courts and is also endorsed by some 
major scholars.95  Yet laborer-protection is a general issue that exists in every industry.  It can be 
said that labor cost, or laborer’s wages, is included in each and every kind of price.  Every item 
sold in the supermarket, for example, entails such cost.  And if its price is not properly paid, the 
chance may increase, more or less, that laborers producing this item will not get fully paid of their 
wages.  Indeed, default on laborers’ wages is by no means a unique phenomenon merely existing 
                                                    
95  Liang, supra note 6, at 378. 
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in the construction industry.  So it seems strange that the law provides special protection solely to 
construction laborers.  A possible rationale on this track is that construction laborers are the most 
vulnerable to such attack, or else, most likely to be attacked.  But this cannot be easily established 
without relevant empirical evidences.  After all, the contractor’s priority right is but an indirect 
mechanism for laborer-protection. 
The second argument is advocated by practitioners in construction industry.  This 
essentially is a contractor-protection argument emphasizing that the construction project is built 
largely on the contractor’s credit.  The contractor provides both materials and labor, so “the 
buildings to be auctioned off (under Article 286) essentially belong to the contractor”.96  
Consequently, some commentators argue that there is “an inherent connection between the 
construction price and the construction project” which cannot be found as for other credits.97  
Only empirical studies can verify whether the construction project is largely credited by the 
contractor.  This argument seems suspectable, however, given the fact that banks do advance 
substantial construction loans to most, if not all, projects.  In some places, it is said that the 
construction loan could be as much as 70% of the whole cost involved in development.98  Even 
though the construction cost is actually financed by the contractor, this cost but stands for part of 
the value of the construction project.  Before the contractor can begin construction, lots of 
                                                    
96  Gu, supra note 34, at 8, citing Liwen Shi, President of Shanghai Jian Gong Group. 
97  Wang, supra note 17, at 66.  Professor Huixing Liang also agrees with this second argument.  It seems that 
he takes it as a supplement to the first, i.e. laborer-protection, argument (see Liang, supra note 6, at 378). 
98  Telephone interview with Jian Zhang, lawyer and specialist in construction law, Fujian Jun Li Law Firm, 
Beijing Office (Mar. 19th, 2005) (This percentage was provided by a bank officer in Fujian province).  In 
Shanghai, the ratio of construction loan is said to be up to 40% in practice (interview with Miao, supra note 
53). 
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preparatory work must be done.  Most obviously, the owner must obtain the land use right, 
resettle the residents on that land and make other preliminary preparations.  Costs for this kind of 
work are indispensable to the construction project.  If these expenses are not paid by the 
contractor, the question will arise whether the project really belongs to the contractor.  In theory, 
it can be argued that the contractor’s priority right exists merely on the value of the project – i.e. 
the building, but not on the land.99  However, I am skeptical whether, in practice, the preparatory 
costs, such as mentioned above, can be attributed solely to the value of either the building or the 
land.  Furthermore, when the construction loan is really used to pay some of the construction cost, 
the argument becomes even less convincing that one provider of such cost (the contractor) should 
be prior to another (the bank). 
Apart from the above two arguments, there is still a third, yet less common, rationale for 
the contractor’s priority right.  It says that the value of the construction project is attributable to 
the contractor’s work and that “the existence of this value constitutes the basis for the realization” 
of “other credits (secured by the construction project)” (emphasis added).100  But for the 
contractor’s work, other creditors would have nothing to sell for satisfaction of their secured 
credits.  As stated above, nonetheless, labor, material and capital all contribute to producing the 
value of construction projects.  When these elements are not provided wholly by the contractor, 
                                                    
99 It has not been settled by the court whether the priority right covers the value of the land.  Some 
commentators suggest that the land value should be excluded from the range of this right (see Zongguo Yao 
& Pu Cui, Jian She Gong Cheng Jia Kuan You Xian Shou Chang Quan Fa Lü Wen Ti Tan Xi [Plobing the 
Questions in the Contractor’s Priority Right] 8 Zhong Guo Lü Shi [Chinese Lawyer] 60, 60 (2004)). 
100 Wang, supra note 17, at 66; see also Nuo Ji & Wei Zhang, Qian Shi Jian She Gong Cheng He Tong Zhong De 
Fa Ding You Xian Quan [A Preliminary Explanation to the Contractor’s Priority Right], at 
http://www.netlawcn.com/second/article.asp?artno=542 .  It used to be my own position on this issue. 
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this third argument is still unpersuasive in term of the reason for contractors being placed at an 
advantageous position over other providers, who collaboratively set up the so-called basis. 
 
B. Cost-Benefit Analysis: Risk Alteration v. Monitoring Efficiency 
By and large, the above policy arguments focus on the fairness among various creditors 
of the owner.  Nevertheless, each of them leaves questions yet to be answered.  Here below, I 
try to explore the issue from the aspect of efficiency by doing a cost-benefit analysis of the 
contractor’s priority right.  In particular, I will stress two effects arising from the change of 
priority rank between the bank and the contractor, namely, risk alteration and monitoring 
efficiency. 
1. Risk Alteration 
The general rule about the priority rank among secured creditors – first in time, first in 
right – is considered to be a response to the problem of risk alteration.101  In other words, 
according to this theory, risk alteration might occur or aggravate where the general rule is not 
followed.  Since the contractor’s priority right creates an exception to the general rule, risk 
alteration is a conceivable cost of Article 286. 
Risk alteration is a phenomenon closely associated with limited liability.  Under the 
limited liability system, no matter how serious the loss might be, an investor’s liability is restricted 
to his equity assets, and any loss beyond that will be borne by his creditors.  If the investment 
succeeds, however, any profit, less the fixed interests of loans, will belong to the investor.  
                                                    
101 Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, Explaining Creditor Priorities, 80 Va. L. Rev. 2103, 2108 (1994). 
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Therefore, when the investor has few assets himself and is mainly playing with other persons’ 
money, he will concentrate merely on the upside potential of the investment.  Other things being 
equal, the more debt one uses to finance his investment, the less he will care about the risk in such 
investment.  To the extreme, when the investor does not have any asset of his own, he won’t 
consider about the risk at all, as he need not bear loss in any event.  A great enough upside 
potential gives the investor an incentive to engage in even socially inefficient investment. 
Usually creditors charge interests for their loans to offset risks.  A creditor, however, can 
only assess the risk, and set the interest rate accordingly, based on the situations known to him at 
the time of reaching the loan agreement, including the amount of equity and debt used to finance 
the investment.  If the investor borrows new money from another creditor thereafter, he will have 
more incentive to engage in a riskier investment, or invest with a riskier method (yet with greater 
upside potential), as the percentage of the investment composed of his equity will be diluted by the 
infusion of the new debt.  It is difficult for the original creditor deal with this specific risk 
resulting from later borrowing by adjusting interest rates ex ante, since he does not have good 
information of such risk when the loan agreement is concluded.  Given that the previous creditor 
cannot, due to transaction costs, be compensated, ex post, for increased riskiness arising from 
every subsequent borrowing, the “first in time first in right” rule “is a more practical means of 
solving the risk alteration problem”.102 
In our context, risk alteration is likely to be a real issue.  When the owner has obtained 
                                                    
102 Id. at 2112-2113 (explaining why the transaction cost may preclude a variable interest rate arrangement that 
compensates the previous creditor for any increased risk, ex post, resulting from each subsequent borrowing). 
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the construction loan but still requires the contractor to advance construction costs, he would be 
able to use the loan for other purposes, probably a riskier investment.  To be more specific, in the 
urban real estate development circle, some owners use construction loans to acquire the land use 
rights of other tracts for future development (so-called “rolling development”). 103  If such new 
investment increases the overall riskiness of the development plan, actually the risk of the 
construction loan is altered.  Now the bank is subject to a higher risk than it contracted for.  But 
for the advances made by the contractor, the owner would not have opportunity to engage in a 
potentially riskier investment. 
A numerical illustration (hereafter, Illustration1) may be helpful to understanding.  
Suppose that Investment A entails $300 cost, in which $100 is financed by the investor’s equity 
and $200 by Creditor1 (hereafter, C1) at an annual interest rate of 10%.  Further suppose that 
Investment A has a 50% chance of turning into $1,000 by the end of the year and another 50% 
chance of shrinking to $250.  In this case, the social payoff is $1,000 * 50% + 250 * 50% - $300 
= $325; the investor’s payoff is ($1,000 - $200 * 110%) * 50% + ($250 - $200 * 110%) * 50% - 
$100 = $305; C1’s payoff is $200 * 110% - $200 = $20.  Now assume that Creditor2 (hereafter, 
C2) advances another $200 loan at an annual interest rate of 15%, which makes the investor to 
engage in Investment B (Investment A can be a subproject included in Investment B) involving 
$500 cost.  Also assume that Investment B has a 50% chance of yielding $1,300 by the end of 
                                                    
103 In my interview with Mr. Chen, he told me one case in which his company was not able to collect the 
construction price of an urban real estate development project.  The reason leading to the owner’s default 
was that the construction loan, maybe with his own equity, was invested to get the land use right of a new 
tract.  Mr. Chen also said that, in his memory, it was the only case in which an owner of an urban real estate 
development project defaulted, to his company, in construction price (interview with Chen, supra note 51). 
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the year and another 50% chance of shrinking to $210.  All other conditions remain unchanged.  
In this new investment, the social payoff changes to $1,300 * 50% + $210 * 50% - $500 = $255; 
the investor’s payoff now becomes ($1,300 - $200 * 110% - $200 * 115%) * 50% + $0 * 50% - 
$100 = $325.  In Investment B, as we have seen, the investor’s payoff increases by $20, which 
gives him an incentive to engage in this investment.  However, the social payoff in Investment B 
decreases by $70, which means, from the social prospective, the investor should engage in 
Investment A rather than B.  C2’s new money actually leads to a less socially efficient investment.  
If no priority right exists and the “first in time, first in right” rule applies, C1’s payoff in 
Investment B is $200 * 110% * 50% + $210 * 50% - $200 = $15; and C2’ payoff is $200 * 115% 
* 50% + $0 * 50% - $200 = -$85.  Obviously, even without the priority right, C1’s payoff 
decreases by $5, due to the risk alteration problem.  Now let’s see the potential function of the 
priority right.  If the subsequent creditor C2 can prevail over the previous creditor C1, then, in 
Investment B, C1’s payoff becomes $200 * 110% * 50% + $0 * 50% - $200 = -$90, while C2’s 
payoff turns to $200 * 115% * 50% + $210 * 50% - $200 = $20.  If C2 knows his payoffs both 
with and without the priority right, he will rationally be ready to advance new money in the former 
case, but refrain from doing so in the latter.  This result shows that the priority right encourages 
subsequent creditors to provide new loans.  Such loans may bring about increased riskiness to the 
previous creditor’s loan and lead to less socially efficient investment as well.  The above results 
of Illustration1 are summarized in the table below. 
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 Social 
Payoff
Investor’s 
Payoff C1’s Payoff C2’s Payoff 
Investment 
A $325 $305 $20 N/A 
With 
Priority Right
Without 
Priority Right
With 
Priority Right 
Without 
Priority RightInvestment 
B $255 $325 
-$90 $15 $20 -$85 
 
Now let’s change a few factors in Illustration1 (This new illustration is called 
Illustration2 hereafter).  Assume that Investment A is financed with only $50 equity and $250 
debt from C1, other conditions being equal.  The investor’s payoff becomes ($1,000 - $250 * 
110%) * 50% + $0 * 50% - $50 = $312.5.  Suppose further that the upside potential of 
Investment B changes to $1,250, and that the investor use $50 equity and $450 debt (including 
$250 from C1 and $200 from C2) to finance it.  All other conditions remain the same.  Then the 
investor’s payoff in Investment B turns to ($1,250 - $250 * 110% - $200 * 115%) * 50% + $0 * 
50% - $50 = $322.5.  So in Illustration2, the investor will engage in Investment B if its upside 
potential is $1,250, but in Illustration1 he will not if the upside potential of Investment B is that 
much (because then the investor’s payoff in Investment B is $300, less than in Investment A, 
$305).  This comparison between Illustration1 and Illustration2 shows that the lower percentage 
of equity the investor applies to the investment, the more likely he will practice risk alteration 
when new debt arises.  Actually, in Illustration1, the investor will have an incentive to engage in 
Investment B, the riskier investment, only if its upside potential is greater than $1,280; but in 
Illustration2, he will turn to Investment B once the upside potential is greater than $1,230. 
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It should be noticed that the above two illustrations merely proves that a subsequent 
borrowing may stimulate the investor to take part in a riskier investment, but by no means implies 
that the every new investment in which the investor manages to engage is necessarily a riskier one 
(i.e., Investment B can be less risky than, or as risky as, Investment A though it entails a higher 
cost).    Therefore, in the context of urban real estate development, if the owner uses the 
construction loan to acquire another land use right for a new project, he does raise the probability 
of risk alteration, but not engage in risk alteration for sure.  It depends, eventually, on the upside 
and downside potential of the scheduled new project. 
2. Monitoring Efficiency 
Apart from the risk alteration problem, the divergence from the general rule – “first in 
time, first in right” – will presumably bring about a second effect: altering creditors’ incentive to 
monitor the “debtor misbehavior”. 
As stated before, the interest rate of a loan agreement is usually fixed and it normally 
reflects the risk level expected by the creditor when the agreement is reached.  Nevertheless, “the 
debtor has an incentive to increase the riskiness of the loan” after it was made, “since, by doing so, 
he effectively obtains a higher-risk loan” at a lower interest rate.104  This phenomenon of 
opportunism is referred to as “threat of debtor misbehavior”.105  In fact, the risk alteration 
problem can also be considered as one form of “debtor misbehavior”. 
As for the creditor, one way to reduce the “threat of debtor misbehavior” is “to monitor 
                                                    
104 Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 Yale L.J. 
1143, 1149 (1979). 
105  Id., at 1150. 
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the debtor’s conduct after the loan has been made”.106  In other words, the creditor can keep 
watch on the debtor’s behavior and prevent him from doing anything that may increase the 
riskiness of the loan.  For example, the creditor can preclude the subsequent borrowing that may 
give rise to risk alteration. 
However, the existence of a security interest gives the creditor less incentive to practice 
monitoring, because “so long as the particular items of property securing his loan remain intact, a 
creditor will be immunized from the effects of his debtor’s misbehavior”,107 thus less monitoring 
is needed to prevent the increase in riskiness of a secured credit.  By the same token, 
subordination of the priority of a creditor’s security interest will add to his incentive to monitor the 
debtor’s misbehavior, if part of his secured credit may become unsecured after such subordination.  
In this sense, the priority right can encourage the previous creditor to practice more intensive 
monitoring. 
The following numerical illustration shows how the creditor’s incentive to monitor 
changes with the subordination of his security interest.  Suppose that Creditor3 (hereafter, C3) 
lends $10,000 to the debtor and that this credit is secured by the collateral with a market value of 
$15,000.  Further suppose that it takes C3 $100 to monitor the debtor’s behavior.  Under C3’s 
monitoring, the probability of the debtor’s default is 10%, but otherwise, it would be 50%, and in 
case of default, the loan can be repaid only by selling the collateral.  If C3 holds the first priority 
on the collateral, he will have no incentive to monitor at all since his loan will be fully repaid, even 
                                                    
106  Id., at 1150.  In this paper, however, the word “monitor” is used in a broader sense, not only including the 
monitoring done after the loan is made, but selection of debtors beforehand as well. 
107  Id., at 1153. 
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without monitoring, by enforcing his security interest in the collateral.  In this case, the $100 
monitoring cost is a net loss reaping no benefit.  Now assume that Creditor4 (hereafter, C4) gets a 
priority right on the collateral securing his loan of $8,000, thus C3’s credit subordinate to C4’s 
credit.  For convenience, let’s assume that the debtor will also default on C3’s loan as long as he 
defaults on C4’s credit.  In this situation, C3’s payoff will be $10,000 * (1 - 10%) + ($15,000 - 
$8,000) * 10% - $100 = $9,600, if he monitors; and $10,000 * (1 – 50%) + ($15,000 - $ 8,000) * 
50% = $8,500, if he does not.  Obviously, C3 does have incentive to monitor when the priority 
rank of his security interest changes from the first to the second.  Therefore, the priority right 
may increase the previous creditor’s monitoring incentive to diminish the “threat of debtor 
misbehavior”. 
From Illustration1 in the above section, we conclude that without the priority right, 
subsequent creditors, willing to provide new loans, are less likely to appear, thus lessening the risk 
alteration problem.  However, this conclusion is made on the assumption that subsequent 
creditors have full knowledge of their potential payoffs both with and without the priority right 
and can take rational actions accordingly.  If, due to information asymmetry, subsequent creditors 
cannot accurately predict their potential payoffs when no priority right exists, they might make 
new loans even without this right.  Under such circumstance, abolishing the priority right will not 
help avoid the problem of risk alteration.  The previous creditor’s monitoring, nonetheless, may 
prevent risk alteration in this event, by restricting the debtor’s engagement in riskier investments.  
In short, when subsequent creditors provide new money anyway, the mere existence of the priority 
right will not increase the potential of risk alteration, while the previous creditor’s monitoring 
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lowers this potential. 
In current Chinese construction market, it seems quite possible that the contractor will 
advance construction costs even without the priority right.  Indeed, the very purpose of adopting 
Article 286 is to deal with the huge amount of unrecoverable construction fees.  Some 
commentators believe the fact that contractors advance construction costs even without the priority 
right can be explained by their vulnerable positions in the market.  In brief, the competition 
among contractors is so fierce that they have to advance construction costs for owners; otherwise 
business opportunities will go away.108  However, I would like to explain this phenomenon as a 
result of the information asymmetry between the owner and the contractor.  The contractor is not 
able to know the effect of his advances on the owner’s investment plan, and therefore cannot 
predict accurately his potential payoff.  Otherwise, if the contractor expects that his advances will 
stimulate risk alteration and leave him with a negative payoff, he will rationally not make such 
advances or engage in the construction work, because winning this work will essentially make him 
worse off.  No matter how vulnerable the contractor’s position might be in the market, he is still 
free to choose to stay away.109  Therefore, to the extent that information asymmetry precludes the 
contractor from making a rational business choice, the risk alteration cannot be considered as 
worsened by Article 286, and its abolition will not necessarily save the social costs resulting from 
risk alteration. 
In a word, two alternative approaches help avoid the risk alteration problem.  One is to 
                                                    
108  See, e.g., Gu, supra note 40, at 8. 
109  Of course, the contractor’s vulnerable position may add to his difficulty in obtaining relevant information. 
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give contractors access to information about owners’ investment and keep the “first in time first in 
right” rule.  Under this approach, contractors will not be willing to advance construction costs if 
their payoffs are expected to be negative, so that owners do not have new money to alter risk.  In 
effect, this first approach leaves the monitoring task with contractors.  Another approach is to 
furnish contractors with priority right.  Under this approach, banks will have more incentive to 
monitor owners’ investments, so that owners are restricted in risk altering practices.  It should be 
ultimately decided by empirical evidences which approach is the more efficient.  Intuitively, 
however, the former seems less practical and contractors tend to be less efficient monitors than 
banks.  Generally speaking, contractors, because of their weak positions, do not have enough 
bargaining power to impel owners to disclose information.  Even if the law imposes disclosure 
responsibilities on owners, for the same reason, contractors have less control over owners’ 
behavior and are not likely to prevent their deviation from the original, less risky investment plan.  
On the other hand, banks are considered to be at advantageous positions over owners.  They may 
require owners to assume contractual responsibilities to disclose investment plan as well as 
periodic financial statements, so that banks can more easily assess the financial effects of owners’ 
actions.  At the same time, to facilitate loan applications or minimize interest rates, owners will 
have incentives to prove themselves as good debtors, thus voluntarily provide information to 
banks.110  In short, banks’ monitoring involves relatively lower information cost.  Moreover, 
banks can also restrict owner’s ability to borrow new debt from other sources through contractual 
                                                    
110  Good debtor’s incentive to disclose information to creditors is explained in Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan 
Priorities, 18 Journal of Legal Studies 209, 220 (1989). 
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arrangements, such as the negative pledge clause.  Aware of owners’ any breach of loan contracts, 
or any action that may increase riskiness of loans, banks can conveniently penalize such 
misbehaviors by stopping advances of new loans or calling advanced loans.  In addition, holding 
the accounts for construction funds and proceeds of sales, banks can also easily control owners’ 
cash flow.  Thus, the enforcement costs essential to banks’ monitoring are also comparatively low.  
Finally, as for those “threat of debtor misbehavior” that cannot be averted with efficient 
monitoring, banks can simply increase the interest rate to make up for the risk.111  Usually, 
however, contractors may not be so flexible in setting their profit rate to counteract extra risks.112 
Some literature has noticed this potential function of Article 286 – banks will develop 
effective monitoring mechanisms for construction funds.113  Banks’ responses to the this rule 
reveal, in some degree, their willingness to improve monitoring over owners’ misbehaviors.  For 
instance, the equity requirement for applying for construction loans was emphasized and its 
percentage raised from 30% to 35%.  As Illustration2 shows, the more equity the owner applies 
to the construction project, the less incentive he will have to practice risk alteration.  So this 
requirement essentially alleviates banks’ burden to monitor.  Banks may also request for 
contractors’ written acknowledgement before advancing loans to owners.  Such request functions 
                                                    
111  See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 105, at 1150-1151 (explaining the relationship between monitoring and 
raising interest rate, as alternative measures to deal with debtor misbehavior). 
112  In Shanghai, for instance, the profit rate of construction work is stipulated, by local guideline for budgeting of 
construction project, to be 7%.  But because of market competition, the actual profit rate tends to be even 
lower (interview with Chen, supra note 51).  In contrast, commercial banks have more freedom to set 
interest rates.  The People’s Bank of China, Chinese central bank, provides a guidance rate periodically and 
commercial banks can set their own rates within a certain range.  According to the latest provision, the 
lower limit of the range is decreasing the guidance rate by 10% and no upper limit is imposed (interview with 
Miao, supra note 53). 
113  Gu, supra note 40, at 4. 
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as supervision over the usage of construction loans, so that contractors have less chance to 
increase the riskiness. 
Summarizing the cost-benefit analysis made above, we can conclude that, in light of the 
situations in current Chinese construction market, Article 286 may not substantially increase the 
risk alteration problem resulting from contractors’ advances of construction costs, but it may 
promote banks’ incentive to monitor owners’ misbehavior, thus, lowering the probability of risk 
altering.  Therefore, Article 286 gives rise to more social benefit than cost and it can be justified 
on this efficiency basis. 
 
C. Some Proposals for Amendment 
If, as the cost-benefit analysis shows, the contractor’s priority right stimulates banks to 
improve monitoring over owner’s conducts, then contractors are supposed to be benefited 
indirectly.  Essentially, we can take banks, owners and contractors114 as a group of investors.  
Both banks and contractors advance credits to owners and depend on the success of construction 
projects for profits.  In this sense, owners can even be regarded as their agents to make profit 
because it is owners who directly take charge of the investment in construction projects.  The 
agent’s opportunism can cause harm to all principals, yet once any principal monitors the agent’s 
misbehavior, the effect will also spill over to other principals.115  In our context, if banks preclude 
                                                    
114  In case of urban real estate development, where purchasers buy residential units before completion of 
construction and pay prices in advance, these purchasers may also be included. 
115  This does not necessarily mean that other principals are free-riders.  If, due to increased costs of monitoring, 
banks charge higher interest rates of construction loans, owners may share these costs with contractors by 
bargain for lower construction prices.  Therefore, assigning the monitoring task to the most efficient monitor 
betters off the whole group by minimizing total monitoring costs. 
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owners from altering risks and assure effective usage of construction funds, the default on 
construction prices will become less likely. 
However, this prediction appears incompatible with my conclusion from the functional 
analysis that the current design of Article 286 does not help contractors much.  To explain this 
contradiction, it should be noticed that the cost-benefit analysis is based on the assumption that 
secured creditors, with different priority ranks, of the same debtor play in a free market 
mechanism.  Under this assumption, the senior creditor is able to sell the collateral if the debtor 
defaults, while the junior creditor is at a risk that his credit cannot be fully recovered if the sale 
really happens.  In reality, this assumption may not be valid for various reasons.  Not 
infrequently, governmental development projects are financed by governmental budgets rather 
than commercial banks, so there are no junior creditors to monitor owners, usually governmental 
entities, for the benefit of senior creditors, i.e. contractors.  Moreover, these projects do not have 
transferability, at least in the commercial market.  They are essentially “security-proof”.  As a 
result, the contractor’s priority right is of no merit with respect to governmental development 
projects.  Instead, some non-market measures, like administrative orders, may be more effective 
to alleviate defaults on construction prices.  On the other hand, as for those situations that do 
satisfy the above assumption, particularly in case of urban real estate development projects, some 
amendments to the current scheme of the contractor’s priority right will probably improve its 
effectiveness. 
1. Precluding Circumvention 
Bank will have incentives to monitor only when no other less costly methods exist to 
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offset the negative influence imposed by the contractor’s priority right.  One such method is to 
circumvent Article 286.  As shown in section II-B-2, banks are more willing to try circumvention 
than practice monitoring.  With these circumventing measures, banks’ positions remain intact 
even after the adoption of Article 286, so they do not need to do more monitoring than before.  In 
order to inspire efficient monitoring by banks, therefore, circumventing arrangements must be 
nullified. 
First of all, any waiver made by contractors ex ante should be invalid.  This is to prevent 
the simplest and most direct circumvention.  It must be noted, however, that contractors may still 
refrain from enforcing their priority right when default actually occurs.  In any event, it is a right 
held by contractors and nobody can obligate them to use it.  It is true that banks might have less 
incentive to monitor when they expect that contractors will not enforce the priority right in the end.  
But in most cases, banks will presumably act under the shadow of Article 286.  They can be 
more diligent with the uncertainty about whether the strings will be pulled eventually.  
Consequently, ex post waivers erode the effectiveness of Article 286 to a lower extent than ex ante 
waivers. 
Second, proceeds of the construction projects should be subject to the contractor’s 
priority right.  Article 286 functions when banks lose to contractors so that they would diligently 
monitor owners.  However, if banks can conveniently offset their loans with the proceeds of 
construction projects, they are actually entitled to a priority, on the proceeds, senior to contractors.  
Since proceeds represent the value of the collateral, this entitlement squarely compensate for 
banks’ loss intended by Article 286.  Therefore, a special account should be kept for proceeds of 
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the construction project and money in this account pledged for the benefit of the contractor.  Only 
after the construction price is fully paid, will the bank be allowed to offset the construction loan 
with the money in this special account.  Insofar as proceeds are subject to the contractor’s priority 
right, any threat arising from contractors’ subordination to purchasers, whether consumers or not, 
will no longer be an issue.  Although contractors cannot chase collaterals after their titles are 
transferred to purchasers, they are still secured by the value of these collaterals. 
The above proposals focus on but two forms of circumvention frequently seen at present.  
New measures should be taken, without delay, to deal with any other sort of circumvention that 
may substantially weaken the effectiveness of Article 286 in future. 
2. Registration Requirement 
One amendment frequently proposed by commentators is that contractors must register 
their priority right in advance; otherwise, they cannot enforce it when owners fall in default.116  
The main reason for this requirement is to protect owners’ other creditors, including banks.117  In 
addition, registration is sometimes said to prevent frauds in calculating the construction price.118  
Essentially, the most important item to register is the amount of this price. 
                                                    
116  See, e.g., Jun Zhang, Lun Jian She Gong Cheng You Xian Quan De Cheng Li Yu Deng Ji [On the 
Establishment and Recording of the Contractor’s Priority Right], 6 Dang Dai Fa Xue [Modern Legal 
Science] 48, 49 (2003); Tongbi Hu, Wo Guo Tai Wan Di Qu Min Fa Cheng Lan Ren Di Ya Quan Zhi Qiu Gai 
[On the Amendments to the Contractor’s Mortgage Right Under Taiwan Civil Code] 5 Xian Dai Fa Xue 
[Modern Law Science] 147, 150 (2003); see also Gu, supra note 33, at 26; Dong supra note 90, at 25-56.  
All these proposals merely require contractors to record in advance, yet none of them made clear whether 
contractors should record before starting construction work, or else, completion of work, when the priority 
right is ripe for enforcement.   Most commentators refer to Japanese Civil Code and Taiwan Civil Code as 
sources of this recording requirement.  According to Japanese Civil Code (art. 338), the record should be 
made before starting work, but Taiwan Civil Code (art. 513) allows contractors to record even after 
completion. 
117  Zhang, supra note 116, at 49; Hu, supra note 116, at 149. 
118  Gu, supra note 33, at 26. 
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With the registration requirement, owners’ subsequent creditors and transferees of 
construction projects will be informed of the contractor’s priority right, so that they could 
internalize potential risks into their interest rates or purchase prices.  Registration does make 
subsequent parties much safer in transactions.  It isn’t beyond doubt, however, whether such 
requirement will do substantial good to owners’ previous creditors, in particular, banks lending 
construction loans.  Banks normally make loans and perfect mortgages before contractors can 
file registration of their priority right.  Registration is not necessary for banks to know the fact 
that contractors have priority right, since the law has made this crystal clear.  But if banks want to 
keep aware of the amount of the senior credit, the construction price, they will have to check the 
registry from time to time.119  Even if banks know this amount, it does not tell the likelihood of 
owners’ default on the construction price.  So banks cannot rely on such registration to decide the 
essential level of monitoring.  In other words, this kind of registration does not reduce banks’ 
information costs for monitoring.  A practical problem in the registration requirement is that the 
amount of the construction price secured by the contractor’s priority right will be fixed once it is 
registered.  However, as pointed out earlier, the actual construction price will change during the 
whole construction process and the amount written in the contract is no more than an estimate.  If 
the registration based this estimate precludes contractors from claiming actual construction prices 
exceeding that amount, the value of the contractor’s priority right might be discounted.120 
                                                    
119  This is not because the amount recorded tends to change but rather because contractors may be entitled to 
record at any point within a certain period of time. 
120  In fact, this is a main reason why the contractor’s priority right is of little practical use in Japan (see Wei 
Zhang, Ri Ben Dan Bao Wu Quan Fa Xiu Gai Zhi Chu Bu Yan Jiu [A Preliminary Study on the Amendments 
to Japanese Secured Transaction Law] Vol.5 No.2 Bei Da Fa Lü Ping Lun [Beijing University Law Review] 
471, 474 (2004)). 
 61 
 
To facilitate banks’ monitoring, contractors should be encouraged to disclose information 
relevant to the riskiness of construction loans.  Therefore, in my point of view, while registration 
may be required for the safety of subsequent parities in transaction, contractors should also be 
required to notify banks, without delay, of any default on payment of construction prices.121  
Otherwise, contractors are not allowed to enforce the priority right to collect the construction 
prices defaulted by owners.  To illustrate, assume that according to the construction project 
contract, the owner should have paid $10,000 to the contractor on September 1st and another 
$10,000 on October 15th, but the owner defaulted on both payments.  If the contractor did not 
notify the bank of the first default before, say, September 10th and merely notified of the second 
default on October 16th, then he could not enforce his priority right later to collect the first $10,000, 
and was only allowed to collect the second $10,000.  This kind of information about owners’ 
default will help banks judge the riskiness of their loans and conduct the necessary monitoring 
accordingly. 
In addition, the notification requirement can alleviate the risk of abusing the contractor’s 
priority right.  If contractors do not give timely notice when default occurs, they will lose their 
security interests thereafter.  Consequently, in such cases as stated in section II-B-1 above, 
owners are not able to collude with contractors to escape repaying construction loans after 
completion of work. 
3. Other Amendments 
                                                    
121  As a more general rule, such notice should be made to any secured creditors whose security interest is 
perfected earlier. 
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The more likely banks feel that contractors will exercise their priority right, the better 
incentive they will have to monitor owners.  Thus, actions should be taken to smooth contractors’ 
way of enforcing the priority right.  The following proposals are targeted at this goal. 
First, many commentators argue that contractors should be allowed to apply directly for 
auction of construction projects without having to go through the trial proceeding first.122  In fact, 
this is one effect of the contractor’s priority right explicitly provided in Article 286.  However, as 
stated hereinabove, courts do not permit this direct execution approach in practice.  Skipping the 
trial proceeding certainly saves time and cost for contractors.  But under current Chinese civil 
procedure rules, even if courts permit contractors’ applications for direct execution, during the 
execution proceeding, other interested parties, owners and banks in particular, will still be able to 
challenge substantive issues of the priority right, amount of construction price or defects in 
construction work, for example.  Once such challenges appear, courts may have to stay execution 
and make judgments over these substantive issues first.  For this sake, I wonder whether the 
direct auction could bring material difference to contractors.  Doubtful as I am, considering the 
time-sensitiveness of the payment of construction price, certain kind of simple procedures might 
be needed to enforce the contractor’s priority right. 
Second, profits should also be protected by the contractor’s priority right.  As business 
entities, contractors’ main purpose of engaging in construction projects is to make profits.  From 
their perspective, a security interest will be of little business value if it does not secure profits.  
                                                    
122  See, e.g., Yonglong Ma & Yan Li, Jian Zhu Gong Cheng Kuan You Xian Shou Chang Quan Fa Lü Shi Yong 
Wen Ti Tan Xi [Probing the Problems in Legal Application of the Contractor’s Priority Right], 6 Xian Dai Fa 
Xue [Modern Law Science] 127, 129 (2003); Zeng, supra note 21. 
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The contractor’s priority right cannot best protect laborers if it is designed purely as a legal 
institution for laborer-protection.  And any attempt to differentiate (laborer’s) living interest with 
(contractor’s) business interest,123 as it seems to me, is far from promising.  In fact, no living 
interest – laborers’ wages – can survive if the contractor’s business collapses.  The real point is to 
explore and make the best use of potentials of the contractor’s priority right, so that everybody 
involved in the construction project could be better off. 
Finally, it deserves a second consideration whether completion should remain as a 
pre-condition to enforce the contractor’s priority right.  On the one hand, as stated above, the 
completion requirement invokes substantial disputes in interpretation and is incompatible with the 
practice in construction industry.  So it may stand in contractors’ way to enforce their priority 
right.  On the other hand, it can be more difficult to sell construction projects before completion 
and probably at much lower price, thus not in the contractor’s best interest to conduct pre-mature 
enforcement.  However, it seems that the degree of either aspect varies from case to case.  
Accordingly, we’d better let contractors make the decision whether the priority right should be 
activated before completion. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The contractor’s priority right may help curb the amount of defaulted payments to 
contractors, but perhaps not in a significant way.  When the construction project has limited 
                                                    
123  This differentiation seems to play a role in determining the scope of the construction price protected by the 
contractor’s priority right (see Wang, supra note 17, at 65). 
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liquidity in the open market, the contractor may not be able to sell or otherwise convert it into 
monetary value when the owner defaults in payment.  The current framework of this priority 
right, delineated by Article 286 and the Supreme Court Interpretation, still has room for 
improvement to better achieve its desired effect where it does work. 
The contractor’s priority right, above all, gives direct protection to contractors and it 
should be geared to do so.  Laborer-protection is no more than a derivative effect.  So the 
efficiency of this system should not be compromised by the laborer-protection objective.  Indeed, 
there are many other measures that can provide more direct and efficient protection to laborers, 
such as the social security system. 
The contractor’s priority right does not function simply by shifting the loss from 
contractors to banks.  Scarcely any existing fairness argument can convincingly justify such a 
redistributional function.  The merit of this system, nevertheless, depends on its overall efficiency 
in reducing risk alteration and monitoring costs.  Therefore, it should be designed in a way to 
incentivize banks to monitor, as they are best equipped to prevent owner’s misbehaviors at the 
lowest cost. 
Some scholars predicate that the priority right system should be adopted by the Chinese 
Civil Code now being drafted, like the Japanese Civil Code.124  This theory advocates granting 
statutory liens to certain special creditors, on debtors’ specific properties or their general assets.  
As for these creditors, the “first in time, first in right” rule does not apply.  In fact, the contractor’s 
                                                    
124  Professor Liming Wang is a representative (see Liming Wang as editor-in-chief, Zhong Guo Wu Quan Fa 
Cao An Jian Yi Gao Ji Shuo Ming [A Proposed Draft of PRC Property Law] (2000).  For a recent study on 
the priority right system under Chinese law, see Mingrui Guo, You Xian Quan Zhi Du Yan Jiu [A Study on 
the Institution of Priority Right] (2004). 
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priority right is but one kind of such priority rights.  Yet risk alteration and monitoring inspiration 
might be the general effects of any kind of priority rights, which amounts to an exception to the 
rule of “first in time, first in right”.  The influences of these effects, however, tend to vary in 
different situations associated with each kind.  When the cost-effective monitoring stimulated by 
a particular priority right is not enough to offset the intensified problem of risk alteration, adopting 
this priority right can lead to a social loss.  The justification, asserted in this paper, for the 
contractor’s priority right might be inapplicable to another priority right.  But a cost-benefit study 
should always be done before any priority right is to be adopted.  Moreover, once the right is 
adopted, follow-up studies should be conducted to track its functioning in reality and adjust the 
legal rules when necessary.  I hope this paper could also be regarded as a case study on the 
necessity of a broader priority right system in the forthcoming Chinese Civil Code. 
